Millianism and Presentism: An Aporetic Pentad

A Millian about proper names holds that the meaning of a proper name is exhausted by its referent. Thus the meaning of 'Socrates' is Socrates.  The meaning just is the denotatum. Fregean sense and reasonable facsimiles thereof  play no role in reference. If so, vacuous names, names without denotata, are meaningless.

Presentism, roughly, is the claim that present items alone exist. This implies that no past or future items exist in the sense of 'exists' that the presentist shares with the eternalist who maintains that past, present, and future individuals all exist.  What exactly this sense is is a nut we will leave for later cracking. 

Now Socrates is a wholly past individual: he existed, but he does presently exist. It follows on presentism that Socrates does not exist at all. The point is not the tautology that Socrates, who is wholly past, does not exist at present. The point is that our man does not exist, period: he is now nothing at all.  

We now have the makings of an aporetic pentad:

1) 'Socrates' has meaning. (Moorean fact)

2) The meaning of a proper name is its referent.  (Millian thesis)

3) If a name refers to x, then x exists.  (Plausible assumption)

4) 'Socrates' refers to a wholly past individual. (Moorean fact)

5) There are no past individuals. (Presentism)

It is easy to see that the pentad is logically inconsistent: the limbs cannot all be true. Which should we reject?

Only three of the propositions are candidates for rejection: (2), (3), (5).   Of these three, (3) is the least rejectable, (5) is the second least rejectable, and (2) the most rejectable.

So I solve the pentad by rejecting the Millian thesis about proper names.

You might budge me from my position if you can give me a powerful argument for the Millian thesis.

Here, then, we have an 'aporetic' polyad that is not a genuine aporia. It is soluble and I just solved it.

The Recalcitrant Ostrich will probably disagree.

Comments

[The Bad Ostrich]

>>I solve the pentad by rejecting the Millian thesis about proper names.

I may actually agree with it? Yes.

[BV]

Excellent! We agree on something.

[The Bad Ostrich]

>> (3) is the least rejectable
However, as you know, I hold that ‘a refers to a’ is consistent with ‘there is no such thing as a’. For example, it is certainly true that ‘Frodo’ refers to Frodo, yet there is no such thing as Frodo. Nor do I believe there are things such that there are no such things. If there is no such thing as Frodo, there is no such thing as Frodo, and there is an end on it. Nor are there any wholly past individuals, although there were wholly past individuals.

This is consistent only on the supposition that ‘refers to’ does not express a real relation.

[BV]

Right. It depends on whether reference is a relation. For if as relation R holds, then all of its relata must exist.

This is why the intentional 'relation' is not a relation strictly speaking. You appear to be thinking of linguistic reference as similar to mental reference (intentionality)in this regard.

>>Nor are there any wholly past individuals, although there were wholly past individuals.<<

True, and indeed tautological, if 'are' is present-tensed; dubious otherwise. If you're game, we'll discuss this in a new thread.

[The Bad Ostrich]

Ostriches are game. (Joke)

[BV]

I like bad, corny, and over-repeated jokes.

I'd guess most jokes are based on amphibolies and equivocations.

"I see you got a haircut." "I got 'em all cut." (amphiboly)

"Past, present, and future walked into a bar. And then things got tense." (equivocation)

But what about:

"What time is it?" "You mean now?" No amphiboly, no equivocation, but a failure of the hearer to understand that 'is' is present-tensed.