Divine Simplicity, Modal Collapse, and a Powers Theory of Modality

This is the third in a series on whether the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) entails modal collapse (MC). #1 is here and #2 here. Most of us hold that not everything possible is actual, and that not everything actual is necessary. I will assume that most of us are right. A doctrine entails modal collapse if it entails that, for every x, x is possible iff x is actual iff x is necessary.  

In God's Powers and Modality: A Response to Mullins on Modal Collapse (no bibliographical information provided, date, or author's name, but presumably by someone named 'Lenow') we read:

Our problem is not with the notion that God has created the world; it is with the fear that we will be forced by divine simplicity to say that God has created the world necessarily. 

[. . .]

I believe that the recent work of Barbara Vetter offers an account of potentiality and modal grounding capable not only of resisting modal collapse, but of doing so along the traditional Thomist lines Mullins rejects as incoherent. Vetter presents us with the theoretical resources needed to affirm divine simplicity without forcing a breakdown in our modal language, and thus allows us to avoid being cornered into asserting that God creates necessarily or that all creaturely events occur necessarily.

We shall see.

What Vetter calls the “standard conception” of a dispositionalist account of modality runs roughly as follows. Objects possess dispositional properties: a vase, for example, possesses the property of fragility; an electron possesses the property of repelling other particles with a negative charge; I have the ability to learn how to play the violin. (3)

I am well-disposed (pun intended) toward this sort of view. 

I am seated now, but I might not have been. I might have been standing now or in some other bodily posture. What makes this true? What is the ontological ground of the (real, non-epistemic) possibility of my not being seated now?  As useful as possible worlds talk is for rendering modal concepts and relations graphic, it is of no use for the answering of this question if we take an abstractist line on possible worlds as sanity requires that we do. On the other hand, David Lewis' concretist approach is, if I may be blunt, just crazy. 

The best answer invokes my presently unexercised ability to adopt a physical posture other than that of the seated posture, to stand up for example.  Ultimately, the ground of real modality is in the powers, abilities, capacities, dispositions, potencies, tendencies, and the like of the things the modal statements are about.

The typical wine glass is fragile: it is disposed to shatter if struck with moderate force. Fragility is a stock example of a dispositional property.  But fragility comes in degrees.  Think of a spectrum of breakability from the most easily breakable items all the way up to items that are breakable only with great difficulty such as rocks and metal bolts and steel beams. We do not apply 'fragile' to things like steel beams, but they too are breakable. 

Yet Vetter is most interested in the property that characterizes all the objects on
this spectrum: the possibility of being broken, the manifestation that she takes to
individuate this property. This modal property that extends from one end of this spectrum
to the other she calls a potentiality—in this case, the potentiality of a thing’s being
breakable.(4)

Now let's see if Vetter's power theory of modality solves our problem.  The problem can be put as follows without possible worlds jargon. There is a tension between divine simplicity and divine freedom.  

1) If God is simple, then he is pure act (actus purus) and thus devoid of unexercised powers and unrealized potentials. He is, from all eternity, all that he can be.  Given that God is simple, there can be no real distinction in him between potency and act. This is necessarily true  because God exists of metaphysical necessity and is essentially pure act.

2) As it is, God freely created our universe from nothing; but he might have created a  different universe, or no universe at all. Had he created no universe, then his power to create would have gone unexercised.  In that case he would not be pure act: he would harbor an unactualized potential.

The dyad is logically inconsistent. What I called a tension looks to be a contradiction. If (1) is true, then it is impossible that God have unexercised powers such as the never-exercised power to create.  But if (2) is true, it is possible that God have unexercised powers. So if God is both simple and (libertarianly) free, then we get a logical contradiction.

If we hold to (1), then we must reject (2). The upshot is modal collapse. For given that God willed our universe with a will that is automatically efficacious, both the willing and the willed are necessary. And so the existence of Socrates is necessary and the same goes for his being  married to Xanthippe and his being the teacher of Plato, etc.

To what work can we put Vetter’s theory in forestalling the threat of modal collapse? Consider God’s will, using Vetter’s language, as an intrinsic maximal first-order potentiality to will God’s own infinite goodness as the ultimate and perfect end of the divine nature. Let me take each descriptor in turn. First, this potentiality is intrinsic, because it does not depend upon any external circumstances for its manifestation and is not possessed jointly. Second, it is maximal, because God cannot fail to manifest this potentiality. As Vetter argued, something is maximally breakable if it is not possible for it not to break—it will break under any circumstances. Similarly, the willing of God’s goodness as end is a potentiality that can be possessed in degrees: rocks do not seem to possess it at all, demons possess it only to the extent that their wills remain a corrupted version of their original unvitiated creation, humans possess it to a greater extent in that the possibility of redemption remains open to them, angels possess it in the highest created degree as a gift from God; yet God “possesses” this potentiality in qualitatively different fashion, possessing it maximally because it is identical with God’s nature—God cannot fail to will God’s goodness. Third, this is a potentiality simpliciter—that is, a first order iterated potentiality, rather than as a potentiality to acquire some other potentiality; the doctrine of divine simplicity removes the possibility of any such composition. Finally, to avoid the threat of modal collapse, this must be a multi-track potentiality, multiply realizable (as are most potentialities); in effect, this means that God is capable of willing God’s goodness in multiple ways, but that no one instance of such willing is any more or any fuller a manifestation of this potentiality than any other such willing. Defenders of divine simplicity typically hold that God’s life is itself full and infinite goodness, lacking nothing.[ . . .] Consequently, had God willed to exist without creation, God would not have willed a lesser goodness than God has willed in creating the world; similarly, had God willed the creation of a different world, God would not have willed a lesser (or greater) goodness than God has willed in creating this one. Each of these acts of willing would have produced different effects, to be sure—but in each case, the potentiality manifested is the same, the potentiality to will God’s infinite goodness as ultimate end.

What is the argument here? It is none too clear.  But one key notion is that of a maximal potentiality. A maximal potentiality is one that cannot fail to be manifested.  An example of a non-maximal potentiality is that of a wine glass to break into discrete pieces when dropped onto a hard surface or struck. That disposition need never be manifested. (Imagine that the glass ceases to exist by being melted down, or maybe God simply annihilates it.) Or think of all the abilities that people have but never develop.

Breakability looks to be a candidate for the office of maximal potentiality. It cannot fail to be manifested. "As Vetter argued, something is maximally breakable if it is not possible for it not to break—it will break under any circumstances." This is a strange formulation. It is true that some things are such that they must eventually break down. But this is not to say that they will break under any circumstances. But let that pass.

Consider now God's power to will his own goodness. We may grant that this is a power that cannot fail to be exercised or manifested. Since it is not possible for God not to exercise this power, it is no threat at all to the divine simplicity. There is no real distinction between God and his willing his own goodness. God's willing his own goodness just is his power to will his own goodness.  This power is plainly compatible with God's being pure act.

But how does this avoid modal collapse?  

Finally, to avoid the threat of modal collapse, this must be a multi-track potentiality, multiply realizable (as are most potentialities); in effect, this means that God is capable of willing God’s goodness in multiple ways, but that no one instance of such willing is any more or any fuller a manifestation of this potentiality than any other such willing.

The second key idea, then, is that of the multiple realizability of liabilities and potentialities and such. I am not now actually sick, but I am liable to get sick, or I have the potential to get sick, in many different ways.  I can get sick from bad food, or polluted water, or a virus can attack me, etc.  My liability to get sick is multiply realizable. The same goes for active powers and abilities.  My power to express myself is realizable in different ways, in writing, in speech, in different languages, using sign language etc. 

God's power to will his own goodness is realizable by creating our universe, some other universe, or no universe at all. So it too is multiply realizable. Fine, but how does this solve the problem? 

Suppose I will to buy whisky. I go to the liquor story and say, "I want whisky!"  The proprietor says, "Very well, sir, would you like bourbon or scotch or rye or Irish?"  If I insist that I just want whisky, I will learn that whisky is not to be had. One cannot buy or drink whisky without buying or drinking either bourbon or scotch or rye or Irish or . . . .

It is the same with God. He cannot will his own goodness 'in general'; he must will it in some specific way, by willing to create this universe or that universe or no universe.

But then we are back to our problem. For whatever he does, whether he creates or not, is necessary and we have modal collapse.  The modal collapse that we all agree is in the simple God spreads to everything else.

As far as I can see, Lenow's response to Mullins fails.

UPDATE (9/4). Joe Lenow writes,

Hi Bill—I am Spartacus. Thanks for engaging the paper. 

 

This is a version of the argument from a conference presentation a couple of years ago; hadn't realized that the conference papers were public view. I've got a much more carefully worked-out version of the argument presently under review; please find it attached. I'd appreciate any thoughts you have on it!

 

Best wishes,

 

Joe Lenow

Resident Assistant Professor of Theology

Creighton University

I will have to study Professor Lenow's latest version. It cannot be reproduced or discussed here, of course, since it is under review.

Comments

[chris m (malcolm)]

Any attribute of God (e.g. omnipotence, omniscience) that has reference to creatures, or is somehow explicable by positing creatures, will fall victim to modal collapse. This is because since God's attributes are identical to the divine essence, if any of those attributes have referents other than simply God himself, then God himself will necessarily extend and include whatever referent is attached to said attribute.

Again, I would only point to my post on this, in which I defend a view of simplicity that avoids modal collapse by claiming that all attributes of God that include creatures or have them as referents in any way are not really attributes of God himself (and thus not identical to the divine essence.)

I'd be interested - and honored, frankly - if you gave it a perusal Bill, when you have the time, and told me what you think.

https://notesonthefoothills.wordpress.com/2018/08/23/solving-the-modal-collapse-by-invoking-the-trinity-and-the-creator-creature-distinction/

[Joe Lenow]

Hi Bill—two points in response:

1) An important part of Vetter's understanding of potentialities is that multi-track dispositions are more fundamental than single-track potentialities (the latter of which are best understood through fine-grained conditionals: "If the vase were struck with 8.65N, it would break"; a different conditional than "If the vase were struck with 8.66N, it would break"). If I read you rightly above, you're open to accepting that a multi-track potentiality is more fundamental than the single-track potentialities (if you're not, Vetter has arguments that this understanding accords better with natural laws). The potentiality is itself the truthmaker of truths of possibility—the vase's property of fragility makes possible all the many ways that the vase can break. And this is true even of potentialities that are actual: the actuality of the ballplayer's catching a baseball entails that the ballplayer possesses the potentiality to catch baseballs; and that potentiality makes true all the possibilities of her catching baseballs.

But if you're willing to accept that, then it seems I've got what I need to avoid modal collapse. The power analogically predicated of the divine life is the truthmaker for all the possibilities of how the world might have been. Even as one "track" of God's willing is eternally actual (God's willing to create the actual world), God's power nevertheless grounds the truths of possibility of all the ways God might have willed the divine good—ways that would lead to other worlds, or no world at all. While we must still predicate the diverse attributes of will and power to the simple God, that difficulty isn't different in kind than predicating omnipotence and omniscience, and I think there are good arguments suggesting how we might do that. As in the case of created powers, the actuality of the disposition is not exclusive of the power's grounding other possibilities. Thus we have true but not actual truths of possibility; no modal collapse.

2) This might seem like creation is still necessary to God—after all, God's will to create the actual world is eternally part of the simplicity of the divine life. It seems that the being of God is determining what God wills. But we only reach this conclusion if we take the being of God to be logically prior to God's willing. If divine simplicity is true, however, this sort of logical priority is inappropriate—the being and act of God are one in the incomprehensibility of the divine life, and one should not be considered more basic than the other. On my account, we certainly don't get a deliberative will or libertarian freedom in God, but we get what Thomas Joseph White has described as "something both like and unlike what we call free choice."

[BV]

Joe,

Thank you for the excellent response. I will respond later in the day.

[BV]

Joe,

Is a multi-track disposition/ability the same as a multiply realizable disposition/ability?

I can catch a ball, say a tennis ball, in different ways: with my right hand, or my left hand, or with a net held in my right hand, or in my left, etc. So that ability of mine can be said to be multiply realizable. But if the ability is realized/exercised, then it has to exercised in a specific way.

Is a multiply realizable ability more fundamental than a very specific ability such as the ability to catch a hard ball with my gloved right hand if the ball is tossed to me at a definite velocity, etc.? I would say No, but it depends on what you mean by 'fundamental.'

>>the vase's property of fragility makes possible all the many ways that the vase can break.<<

It is true that the vase can be broken in many ways: by being dropped, struck with a hammer, subjected to sound and vibration; and in each of these ways in different ways: dropped onto Saltillo tile, onto hardwood flooring, and from different heights. Or the vase can be thrown against a brick wall or a stucco wall or an earthen wall, with this velocity or that, etc etc.

Now if we speak of the vase's fragility or disposition to break we are abstracting from all of these specific or rather individual ways of breaking. It seems to me that if a particular vase in particular circumstances breaks, then that breakage is a manifestation of a particular, not a general disposition, for example, the disposition to break if hit laterally with a force of 8.65N.

Every manifestation in reality is a particular, determinate manifestation -- say with x number of distinct shards breaking off in definite directions -- of a particular determinate disposition.

I assume that a disposition and its manifestation need to be distinguished, and that a disposition can exist without ever being manifested being manifested.

So God's power to will his own goodness/glory is a mere abstraction from definite ways of willing. He has to either create or not create, and if he creates he has to create something maximally determinate such as our universe.

[Joe Lenow]

Right—I agree that on the understanding of dispositions that you've outlined (what Vetter calls the "standard conception of dispositions"), either we must surrender divine simplicity or the modal collapse goes through. Vetter, however, argues that there are good reasons to reject the standard conception, on which the single-track disposition is more fundamental than the multi-track one. (She tends to prefer the language of multi-track to multiply-realizable, though she uses the latter both in relation to the standard conception (Vetter (2015), 41) and, if I am reading her correctly, her own (114)).

Take, for instance, electric charge. On the standard conception of dispositions, electric charge must be an infinite conjunction of single-track dispositions of the form: If x were at a distance of 5.3*10^-11 m from a charge of 1.6*10^19 C, then x would exert a repulsive force of 8*10^-8 N (Vetter (2015), 52). Fine: we can imagine such an infinite conjunction of dispositions.

And so we can imagine a version of Coulomb's Law holding across all such electric charges: (CL*) For all x, if x has charge e and is 5.3*10^-11 m from a charge of 1.6*10^19 C, then x would exert a repulsive force of 8*10^-8 N. (Vetter (2015), 56)

Vetter admits, "Laws of (CL*)'s ilk would explain an infinity of such regularities, one by one. But they would leave entirely unexplained and inexplicable the much more striking regularity that holds *between* those more specific regularities of behaviour: the regularity, that is, which consists in the exerted force's always standing in the same mathematical relation to the charges present and their distance from one another" (57).

In light of these considerations, she concludes that, to account for functional laws like Coulomb's Law, we should hold that the multi-track disposition of electric charge is more fundamental, and grounds all the single-track dispositions. And not only at the micro-physical level, but also at the level of dispositions like fragility. This multi-track disposition itself grounds the possibility of all the tracks along which it is possible for that disposition to be realized.

While I agree that "every manifestation in reality is a particular, determinate manifestation" (and so my account doesn't depend on God willing God's goodness "in general"—only on the multi-track power of willing God's goodness, which, as a maximal disposition, must be eternally realized along some particular track), if the actuality of some track entails possessing the disposition making possible that actuality (Vetter's axiom ACTUALITY, from (2015), 182), then that potentiality continues to serve as the truthmaker of the possibility of all the other tracks that might have been realized. So once again, I agree that God "has to either create or not create, and if he creates he has to create something maximally determinate such as our universe"—any indeterminacy in God's willing would require change in God or denial of God's omniscience. But I deny that this precludes God's power from serving as the truthmaker for truths about worldly contingencies.

I am certainly leaving myself open to the objection that I'm placing undue stress on one recent and controversial understanding of dispositional properties. In point of fact, however, it seems to me that Vetter is just arguing that present understandings of powers should be corrected in the direction of the Thomist/Aristotelian tradition (though there remain important differences between her position and Thomist accounts of powers).

[BV]

Joe,

That's helpful. Unfortunately, I don't have Vetter's book. My knowledge of her view is based on her 2013 article "'Can' Without Possible Worlds."
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx/can-without-possible-worlds-semantics-for-anti-humeans.pdf?c=phimp;idno=3521354.0013.016;format=pdf

I'll think about it some more tomorrow.

[Vince S]

Hi,

I'd like you to consider the following modal argument, if you will. It cannot be objected to by reason of substitution in referentially opaque modal contexts (since necessity is the only modality we are using).

1. Necessarily, God exists.
2. Necessarily, God's essence is identical to His existence.
3. Necessarily, an act of creation by God (referring to what is intrinsic to God) is identical to the act of God.
4. Necessarily, the act of God is identical to the existence of God.
5. Therefore, necessarily, God's act of creation is identical to the existence of God.
6. Therefore, necessarily, God's act of creation is identical to the essence of God.
7. Therefore, God's act of creation is necessary.
8. Necessarily, God's act of creation entails what is created.
9. Therefore, what is created necessarily exists.
10. Necessarily, everything that exists that is not God is created.
11. Therefore, everything that exists exists necessarily.

Only one possible objection to validity could be made and that would be to say that "an act of creation by God" in 2. is not a strictly rigid designator - it does not refer to the exact same thing across all possible worlds. However, this objection is shown to be begging the question - conclusion 6. shows that it is in fact the same thing across all possible worlds, since God's essence is the same across all possible worlds, and the act of creation by God is identical to it in all possible worlds.

Now, since the argument is valid, but the conclusion is incorrect (modal collapse), one of the six premises (1, 2, 3, 4, 8, or 10) must be incorrect.

1. is demanded by Divine aseity.
2. is demanded by Divine simplicity (as well as aseity).
3. is demanded by Divine simplicity (there cannot be a multiplicity of acts in God).
4. is demanded by Divine simplicity (there is no distinction between what God is and what He does).
10. is demanded by God as First Cause (everything that is not God is caused to exist by Him).

The only way to avoid the conclusion is to deny 8. Which means that there is no pre-determination by God in the created universe, not even by way of "from eternity" - God's creation is non-determinative. (A similar argument holds if, instead of creation, other objects of God's willing are used, so we can conclude His causation is non-determinative.) To say the universe exists "because" God created it only means that the universe is ontologically dependent on God for its existence. It does not mean God pre-determined that this universe should be the one which exists, or that any particular thing in it happens. But, couldn't at least some things (even if not all) be entailed by God's act of creation? No, because any of those things would likewise exist necessarily, meaning God creates them in all possible worlds. Put simply, "God wills X to exist" has no real informational content beyond "God exists, and X exists".