God, Simplicity, Freedom, and Two Senses of 'Contingency'

Fr. Aidan Kimel wants me to comment on his recent series of posts about divine simplicity, freedom, and the contingency of creation. In the third of his entries, he provides the following quotation:

As Matthew Levering puts it: “God could be God without creatures, and so his willing of creatures cannot have the absolute necessity that his willing of himself has” (Engaging the Doctrine of Creation, p. 103). That is the fact of the case, as it were. Granted the making of the world by a simple, immutable, and eternal Deity, we have no choice but to accept the apparent aporia:

Indeed, there is no ‘moment’ in God’s eternity in which he does not will all that he wills; there is no God ‘prior’ to God’s will to create. In this sense, God can be said to will necessarily everything that he wills. The potency or possibility stems not from God’s will, but from the contingent nature of the finite things willed; they do not and cannot determine the divine will. (Levering, p. 103)

The problem is to understand how the following  propositions can all be true:

1) There is no absolute necessity that God create: "God could be God without creatures."

2) God created (better: ongoingly creates and sustains) the universe we inhabit.

3) God, being simple or metaphysically incomposite, is devoid of potency-act composition and unexercised powers: God is pure act.

4) The universe we inhabit, and indeed any universe God creates, is modally contingent: it does not exist of metaphysical necessity.

The problem, in brief, is to understand how a universe that is the product of a divine act of willing that is necessary (given God's simplicity) can yet be contingent. Levering's answer does not help at all. In fact, he seems to be confusing two senses of contingency when he says that "the contingent nature of the finite things willed" does not determine the divine will.  That's right, it doesn't and for the simple reason that the finite things willed depend entirely on the divine will and are in this sense contingent upon the divine will; but this is not the relevant sense of 'contingency.' Let me explain.

In the modal sense, a contingent item is one that is possible to be and possible not to be, as Aquinas says somewhere. In 'possible worlds' jargon, x is modally contingent =_df x exists in some but not all metaphysically (broadly logically) possible worlds.  

In the dependency sense, x is dependently contingent =_df there is  some y such that (i) x is not identical to y; (ii) necessarily, if x exists, then y exists; (iii) y is in some sense the ground or source of x's existence. 

It is important to see that an item can be (a) modally contingent without being dependently contingent, and (b) dependently contingent without being modally contingent.

Ad (a). If the universe is a brute fact, as Russell (in effect) stated in his famous BBC debate with Copleston, then the universe exists, exists modally contingently, but has no cause or explanation of its existence.  If the universe is a brute fact, then of course it does not depend on God for its existence.  Its existence is a factum brutum without cause or explanation. It is contingent, but not contingent upon anything. It is modally but not dependently contingent.

Ad (b). Not all necessary beings are "created equal."  That is because one of them, God, is not created at all. The others are creatures, at least for Aquinas. (A creature is anything that is created by God.) The number 7 serves as an example, as does the proposition that 7 is prime.  That proposition is a necessary being. (If it weren't it could not be necessarily true.)  But it has its necessity "from another," namely, from God, whereas God has his necessity "from himself."  The doctor angelicus himself makes this distinction.

These so-called 'abstract objects' -- not the best terminology but the going terminology -- are creatures, and, insofar forth, dependent on God, and therefore contingent upon God, and therefore (by my above definition), dependently contingent. They are dependently contingent but modally necessary. 

Now let's apply the distinction to our problem. The problem, again, is this: How can the product of a necessary creating be contingent? One might think to solve the problem as follows.  God necessarily creates, but what he creates is nonetheless contingent because  what he creates is wholly dependent on God for its existence at every moment. But this is no solution because it involves an equivocation on 'contingent.'

The problem is: How can the product of a modally necessary creating be modally contingent? 

Think of it this way. (I assume that the reader is en rapport with 'possible worlds' talk.) If God is simple, and he creates U in one world, then he creates U in all worlds. But then U exists in every world, in which case U is necessary. But U is contingent, hence not necessary. Therefore, either God does not exist or God is not simple, or U is not a divine creation.  

Fr. Kimel wanted me to comment on his posts. One comment is that they are top-heavy with quotations.  Quote less, argue and analyze more.

Now I would like the good padre to tell me whether he agrees with me.  I think he just might inasmuch as he speaks of an aporia.  We have good reasons to believe that God is simple, and we have good reasons to believe that the created universe is modally contingent. Suppose both propositions are true. Then they must be logically consistent.  But we cannot understand how they could both be true. So what do we do?

One way out is to jettison the divine simplicity. (But then we end having to say that God is a being among beings and neither I nor Kimel will countenance that, and for good reasons.) A second way is by denying that the created universe is contingent, either by maintaining that it is necessary or by denying that there is any real modality, that all (non-deontic) modality is epistemic.  The second way leads to a load of difficulties.

A third way is by arguing that there is no inconsistency. But I have argued that there is both above and in other recent posts dealing with the dreaded 'modal collapse.'  And it seems to me that my argumentation is cogent.

Well suppose it is. And suppose that the relevant propositions are all true. There is yet another way out. We can go mysterian.  The problem is a genuine aporia. It is insoluble by us. God is simple; he freely created our universe; it is modally contingent.  How is this possible? The answer is beyond our ken. It is a mystery.

Now if Fr. Kimel is maintaining something like this, then we agree.

Corrigendum (9/25). A reader points out, correctly, that in the above graphic the gentleman on the left is not Fr. Copleston, but A. J. Ayer.

Comments

[Vince S]

I agree that Thomism has no answer for this except by equivocation on the meanings of "contingent" and "necessary" and by the spurious appeal to the distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity.

But, you're assuming the act of creation (which is identical to God's essence according to simplicity) entails what is created. Put another way, you're assuming that "God created X" has additional informational content beyond "God exists", "X exists", and "X is ontologically dependent upon God".

[BV]

Yes, I am assuming that God's creating of x entails the existence of x. Now entailment is a modal notion. So if God creates x, then it is impossible that x not exist.

How could divine creation NOT entail existence? God creates things by willing them into existence *ex nihilo.* God's will cannot fail to be efficacious. (This follows from the divine omnipotence.)

So I am having some trouble understanding your point.

Perhaps what you mean is that if God creates a universe he does not merely cause there to be some universe or other, but a particular universe distinguished from all possible others by its unique set of properties. Well, yes. What's the problem? God cannot will a universe to come into being without willing a particular universe with a complete set of properties to come into being.

Let U1, U2, U3 . . . Un be particular possible universes. And take 'x' as a free variable in 'God creates x.' Then 'God creates U1' is a substitution instance of the open sentence or sentential function 'God creates x.' I grant you that 'God creates U1' "has additional informational content" beyond that contained in 'God creates x,' if 'x' is a variable.

But so what? God cannot create a universe in general; he can only create particular universes.

What am I missing?

[Vince S]

God's act of creation is identical to His existence, which is identical to His essence, under Divine simplicity. Thus, if His existence does not entail X, then neither can His act of creation.

Now granted "God's creation of X" does entail X, and there can be no intrinsic difference in God between "God's act of creation" and "God's creation of X", according to Divine simplicity. So, if "God's creation of X" is an intrinsic property of God, then X exists necessarily (the modal collapse). However, the other possibility is that "God's creation of X" doesn't refer to anything in God beyond His essence, and is in reality merely equivalent to the conjunction of "God exists" and "X exists".

To argue for the second possibility, I'd point out that "God's creation of Y" is identical to "God's creation of X" under Divine simplicity. Yet the latter entails X while the former does not.

[Vince S]

In short, I am saying the following is an aporetic triad.

1. God is simple.
2. The actual world is not the only possible world.
3. Divine causality is determinative.

[BV]

>>"God's creation of Y" is identical to "God's creation of X" under Divine simplicity.<< Yes.

>>Yet the latter entails X while the former does not.<< No. X = Y on divine simplicity.

[BV]

Finally, at 4:53, you make yourself clear.

Those three propositions cannot all be true. Given that (3) is obvious and will be granted by all, we have three options:

a) Reject the divine simplicity, or
b) Accept modal collapse, or
c) Insist that all three propositions are true despite their apparent inconsistency.

What one cannot do is maintain that (1) is consistent with (2).

[Mark]

Posting this here only because I cannot find an email address for you on the blog page, and I occasionally want to drop you a note of thanks or comment.
I just like that you pour so much into this, and the content quality seems very high to me. Check in daily.
When I saw the post about Dion, I knew I had to write again. I like that guy a lot.
Have been reading a lot of Voegelin lately and have not seen much from you about him, though what I have seen has been very positive.
I'll keep it short. No idea if you'll see this.

[BV]

Thanks for the kind words, Mark.

Go to the right sideboard. and click on About (near the top).

[Ashley]

That's Ayer and Russell in the photo provided, not Copleston and Russell.

[Fr Aidan Kimel]

Hi, Bill. Thank you for interacting with my series on Aquinas.

One of my readers was inspired enough by your posting to take a stab at a refutation. You may want to take a look at it: https://afkimel.wordpress.com/2018/09/25/on-the-putative-threat-of-modal-collapse-within-the-doctrine-of-divine-simplicity/