Two Senses of 'Tenseless'

The first sense I mention only to set aside. Timeless entities, if there are any, exist tenselessly and have their intrinsic properties  and some of their relational properties tenselessly.  The 'exists' in '7 exists' is tenseless, and so is the 'is' in '7 is prime.' And please note that the tenselessness is not a result of a de-tensing operation or an abstraction from tense: the tenseless terms are inherently tenseless because the entity in question is inherently timeless.  So far, no problem.  Talk of tenselessness with respect to timeless entities, if any,  is wholly intelligible.

Problems arise when we ask whether temporal objects, items in time, can be intelligibly described as tenselessly existing or tenselessly propertied.   Is it intelligible to say that Boethius tenselessly exists and is tenselessly a philosopher?  In one sense it is; but the  sense in which it is gives no aid and comfort to presentism.  That is what I will rehearse in this post. 

TENSELESSNESS AS DISJUNCTIVE OMNITEMPORALITY

We consider the disjunctively omnitemporal sense according to which 'x tenselessly exists' means 'x existed or x exists or x will exist' where each disjunct is tensed, and 'x is tenselessly F' means that 'x was F or x is F or x will be F' where each disjunct is tensed. This sense of 'tenseless' is not properly tenseless: tensed expressions must be used to formulate it. But while improper, it is has the virtue of being wholly intelligible. Thus Julius Caesar tenselessly exists in the disjunctively omnitemporal sense in that he either existed, or exists (present tense), or will exist. He tenselessly exists because the first of these tensed disjuncts is true. When we say that he tenselessly exists we are simply abstracting from when he existed. We are leaving the 'when' out of consideration. We are not thereby attributing to the man some non-disjunctive property of tenseless existence, whatever that might be.

And similarly with 'Julius Caesar is a Roman emperor.' We all understand the sentence to be true despite Caesar's having ceased to exist long ago. We take the sentence to be tenselessly true because we read the copula in the disjunctively omnitemporal sense.  The same goes for 'Hume is an empiricist,' a sentence one might find in a history of philosophy. Although Hume does not now exist, we can say, intelligibly, that he IS an empiricist because we are using 'is' in a disjunctive omnitemporal way.  

DOES DISJUNCTIVELY OMNITEMPORAL TENSELESSNESS HELP US UNDERSTAND THE PRESENTIST V. ETERNALIST DEBATE?

Unfortunately, it doesn't.  The presentist tells us that only present items exist, whereas the eternalist says that past, present, and future items all exist.  To engage each other they have to be using 'exist' in the same sense: their disagreement is predicated upon an agreement as to the sense of 'exists.' Now  it it is clear that this cannot be the present-tensed sense of 'exists.'   Nor can it be the timelessly tenseless sense of 'exists.'  And not the disjunctively omnitemporal sense either.  Why not?

Everyone agrees that Boethius no longer exists. But 'no longer exists' can be understood in two ways. The eternalist (B-eternalist) holds that what no longer exists exists all right, but in the past. The presentist, however, holds that what no longer exists does not exist.  For the eternalist, Boethius tenselessly exists.  For the presentist, Boethius does not tenselessly exist. Therefore, for the presentist, it is not the case that Boethius either did exist or does exist or will exist.  But this is plainly false, since Boethius did exist. Therefore, the sense of 'exists' that allows presentist and eternalist to engage each other cannot be the disjunctively omnitemporal sense of 'tenseless.'

So what the hell sense of 'tenseless' is it?  

More later. It's Saturday night. Time for a stiff one and Uncle Wild Bill's Saturday Night at the Oldies.

Comments

[The Bad Ostrich]

This discussion seems also to engage with the logical presentist’s challenge to give a non-trivial sense to presentism. Suppose we define *exists as meaning ‘exists, or existed, or will exist’. Then it is true that Boethius no longer exists, although he *exists. But presumably not true in the sense that the metaphysical presentist wants, since it is trivially true. Right?

[BV]

Yes, but it is tricky. The following are both unproblematically true:

1. Boethius no longer exists.

2. Boethius *exists in the following disjunctive sense: he existed or he exists or he will exist.

(2) is true because the first disjunct is true.

The metaphysical presentist needs a sense of 'exist' that allows him to engage the eternalist and disagree with him. They must agree about what 'exists' means if they are to disagree about what exists. Now which sense of 'exists' is that? Can't be the disjunctive sense.

The eternalist says that past, present, and future items all (tenselessly) exist. Now if tenseless 'exists' = disjunctive 'exists,' then we hit a snag:

The presentist denies that Boethius tenselessly exists. So, given the above equation, the presentist denies that (Boethius existed or exists or will exist). Trouble is, he doesn't and he can't.