Intrinsic Intentionality and Merely Possible Thoughts

I claimed earlier that there are no intrinsically intentional items that lack consciousness.  The claim was made in the context of an attempted refutation of the notion that abstract entities, Fregean senses being one subspecies thereof, could be intrinsically intentional or object-directed. One argument I gave was that (i) No abstract entity is conscious; (ii) Only conscious entities are intrinsically intentional; ergo, (iii) No abstract entity is intrinsically intentional. 

David Gudeman demurs, targeting premise (ii):

I may have a counter-example for you, a class of items that 1. Are intrinsically intentional, 2. Are not conscious. The class of things I have in mind is possible thoughts. For example, right now I am thinking about thoughts, but if I had bought that cherry pie earlier today, I would probably be thinking about the cherry pie. My thought of the cherry pie is possible but not actual, so it is not conscious, but it is about the cherry pie, and therefore intrinsically intentional. Also, if there were no actual objects in the universe there would still be possible minds with possible thoughts--intentional objects that exist in a universe without minds.

I take Dave to be arguing as follows:

1) Every thought (thinking) is intrinsically object-directed.

Therefore

2) Every merely possible thought (thinking) is intrinsically object-directed.

3) Some merely possible thoughts (thinkings) are not conscious.

Therefore

4) Some intrinsically object-directed items are not conscious.

A delightfully seductive argument!

I question the inference from (1) to (2) on the ground that there are no merely possible thoughts.  (1) is true, but (2) is false if there are no merely possible thoughts. 

It is of course possible that I think about cherry pie.  But it doesn't follow that there is a possible thought about cherry pie which somehow subsists on its own.   Possibilities are grounded in actual items. I actually exist and have various powers. Among them are powers to think about this or that.  So, from 'Possibly, I am thinking about x' it does not follow that there is a possible thought about x. 

I believe I have said enough to show that Dave's argument, as I have reconstructed it, is not rationally compelling.

Comments

[David Gudeman]

Ah! I made it to the front page!

Well, I'll try to resist the temptation of debating whether possible things exist with the man who wrote the book on existence :) but here's another possible exception: subconscious or unconscious thoughts.

I don't know your position on the subconscious (I don't think it exists) but if you think there is such a thing, then subconscious thoughts are a counterexample. For example, if, as Freud claimed, women subconsciously want to have sex with their fathers, then this subconscious desire represents their father and is not conscious. Outside of Freud's speculations, there is often talk of unconscious desires or goals, which would also be counterexamples if you credit them.