In David Horowitz's Dark Agenda: The War to Destroy Christian America (Humanix, 2018), we read:
My own theological views are those of an agnostic -- one who doesn't know. I do not know whether there is a Divine designer or not. (p. 24)
Well, I don't know either. I agree with Horowitz when he tells us, on the preceding page, that
. . . the question of whether God exists cannot be resolved. Both sides must rely on faith. (p. 23)
So what is the difference between me and Horowitz? We are both agnostics by his definition. But I am a theist whereas he is not. It appears that we need to distinguish different types or grades of agnosticism. It will develop that one can be both a theist and an agnostic.
AG-1: "I don't know, and I don't care. The existence of God is not a (live) issue for me." This sort of agnostic is a practical atheist. He lives as if there is no God, but without denying or doubting his existence.
AG-2: "I don't know, but I care, and I appreciate the importance of the question. But I see no good reason either to affirm or to deny, and so I suspend judgment. Rather than trouble my head over such a question, I content myself with the ordinary life of a mortal man. I do not dream of immortality or hanker after transcendence. While I grant that the question is of some importance, I do not consider the question of enough importance to trouble myself over it." This sort of agnosticism is close to Pyrrhonism.
AG-3: "I don't know, but I care, and I appreciate the importance of the question. And while I see no good reason to affirm or deny, I don't suspend judgment; I continue to inquire. I sense that my ultimate happiness is at stake, and that it would be imprudent simply to dismiss the question as unanswerable and sink back into everydayness."
AG-4: "I don't know, but I care, and I appreciate the great importance of the question. What's more, I find nothing epistemically disreputable about believing beyond the evidence, seeing as how we do this regularly in other areas of life; I cannot, however, bring myself to believe."
AG-5: "I don't know, but I care, and I appreciate the great importance of the question. I am inclined to believe, and I do believe, for reasons that are not rationally compelling, but also not epistemically disreputable. My faith is a living faith, not merely intellectual assent to a proposition; it is something I live, and my living as I do attests to the psychological reality of my believing."
The fifth grade of agnosticism is a type of theism. It is not the theism of the one who claims to know that God exists, or who claims to be able to prove that God exists. But it is theism nonetheless, for it is an affirmation of the existence of God. It follows that one can be both an agnostic and a theist. In fact, I would argue further that an agnostic is the only sort of theist one ought to be.
To conclude, what is the difference between me and Horowitz? We are both agnostics by his definition. But whereas I am an AG-5 agnostic, he, as far as I can tell, is an AG-3 agnostic.
Addendum (12/12). Vito Caiati responds:
I found your most recent post “Five Grades of Agnosticism” most valuable in that it succinctly sets out the quite diverse tenors of this philosophic position on the existence of God. Over the years, I have fallen into all of these “five grades,” with the exception of AG-1. As you know, I now, as for much of my life, affirm a much more specific version of AG-5, one that centers my life on Christian dogmas and practices, as taught by the Roman Catholic Church. My most recent return to Catholicism was, if you recall from our correspondence over the last few years, fraught with intellectual conflict, since my faith exists alongside of a powerful skeptical inclination, which is only further reinforced once the already daunting difficulties involved in an assertion of God’s existence are compounded by those involved in matters of dogma and doctrine. I have often thought that it would be best to remain with the embrace of philosophic theism, which is, I assume, what you are affirming in AG-5, that is, the affirmation of the existence of a theistic God and an adherence to those moral precepts that are evident to reason and conscience. Am I right about this?
Not quite. I am thinking of AG-5 as a type of theism that could be filled out and made more specific in different ways. One could add some or all of the following beliefs: immortality of the soul, resurrection of the body, triune nature of the one God, divine simplicity, divine incarnation, and so on through a range of even more specific beliefs concerning, e.g., the nature of post-mortem rewards and punishments, the impossibility of gaining merit after death, etc. None of these are precluded by the AG-5 schema. What the schema excludes is any claim to knowledge with regard to these matters. I am assuming that knowledge entails objective certainty. And so AG-5 runs counter to the traditional Roman Catholic claim that its magisterium teaches infallibly with absolute, divinely sanctioned and grounded authority, with respect to faith and morals. AG-5 rules out that sort of dogmatism.
If so, where does religion fit in, since a commitment to theism, even one that guides one’s mode of life is not a religion but a private philosophic and moral stance? Is it your position that a life-shaping belief, in a theistic God renders the choice of, say, a particular religious tradition not of first importance? So, for example, one might simply be advised to follow the theistic tradition into which one was born, as long as it possesses doctrinal, ethical, and liturgical features that are not inimical to the existence of a deity as classically construed?
AG-5 is not a merely philosophical schema that excludes religion. I am thinking of it as allowing for religious deployment and development. And if religion is communal, then the schema would permit a development that was not merely private.
I would say that a life-shaping belief in God (which goes beyond the mere belief that God exists) does not require adherence to any extant religious tradition. But that would be a hard row to hoe for most. They would be well-advised to stick to the tradition in which they were raised -- except perhaps for Islam which is more of a destructive political ideology than a religion, although for peaceful Muslims it is better than no religion.
So you, Vito, would be well-advised to remain within the Roman Catholic ambit, provided you can find a parish with a Latin mass that is not manned by pedophiles or mere social workers or theological know-nothings and that adheres to and attempts to transmit traditional teachings.
Your post raises many other questions and concerns, such as those touching on revelation, but I will stop here.
Yes it does, and I am willing continue the conversation "until death do us part." It is my firm belief that there is no better and more noble way to spend the lion's share of one's brief time here below than by addressing, reverentially but critically, the Great Questions. And that includes the question of the possibility and actuality of divine revelation and all the rest of the theological and philosophical conundra, including Trinity, Incarnation, Transubstantiation, Ascension, Assumption, and so on, until death which, we hope, will lift the curtain and bring us light.
And if it doesn't? Well then, we have spent our lives in a most excellent way and have lost nothing of value.
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