Any reasons one adduces in support of the thesis of the infirmity of reason will share in the weakness of the faculty whose weakness is being affirmed. Is this a problem for the proponent of the thesis? Does he contradict himself? Not obviously: he might simply accept the conclusion that the reasoning in support of the thesis is inconclusive.
Suppose I argue that, with respect to all substantive philosophical theses, there there are good arguments pro and good arguments contra, and that these arguments 'cancel out.' Now my thesis is substantive, and so my thesis applies to itself, whence it follows that my meta-thesis has both good arguments for it and good arguments against it, and that they cancel out.
Where is the problem? I am simply applying my meta-philosophical skepticism to itself, as I must if I am to be logically consistent. Now I could make an exception for my meta-thesis, but that, I think, would be intolerably ad hoc.
I am not dogmatically affirming the infirmity of reason; I am merely stating that there are reasons to accept it, reasons that are not conclusive.
Deeper into this topic:
Seriously Philosophical Theses and Argument Cancellation
Thought, Action, Dogma, and De Maistre: The Infirmity of Reason
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