Summa Theologica, Q. 19, Art. 3: Whether Whatever God Wills He Wills Necessarily

This is the question we have been discussing. Let us now see if the answer Thomas gives is satisfactory.  The question is not whether, necessarily, whatever God wills, he wills.  The answer to that is obvious and in the affirmative. The question is whether whatever God wills, he wills necessarily. If so, then God's willing creatures into existence is a necessary willing despite the creatures being contingent. If not, then God's willing contingent creatures into existence is itself contingent.  

Objection 4. Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.

This 'objection' strikes me more as an argument for the thesis that whatever God wills he wills necessarily than as an objection to it. The gist of the argument is as follows. If it is not the case that whatever God wills he necessarily wills, then the divine will is in some cases contingent. But the divine perfection rules this out. Ergo, etc.

Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.

This reply takes us to the heart of the matter.  The solar analogy is arguably lame, so let's just ignore it. 

The way I have been thinking is along the following lines. No contingent effect can have a necessary cause. The effect that presently interests us is the contingent existence of (concrete) creatures.  The cause is not God, but God's willing these creatures into existence ex nihilo.  So I'm thinking that the divine willing whereby the concrete universe of creatures was brought into existence out of nothing had to be a contingent willing - - with disastrous consequences for the divine simplicity.  

For if God is a necessary being, and, as simple, identical to his willing creatures into existence, then his willing is necessary. But then one might be forgiven for thinking that creatures are also necessary.  Bear in mind that the divine will is omnipotent and necessarily efficacious. Or else we run the argument in reverse from the contingency of creatures to the contingency of divine willing. Either way there is trouble for classical theism. 

The Thomist way out is to ascribe the contingency of creatures, not to the contingency of the divine will whereby they are brought into existence,  but to their own ontological deficiency and imperfection.  God, willing his own good, wills creatures as manifestations of his own good. As neither self-subsistent nor purely actual, creatures are mutable and imperfect. Moreover, God has no need of them to be all that he is.  The reality of the ens reallissimum and the perfection of the ens perfectissimum are in no way enhanced by the addition of creatures: God + creatures = God. (More on this 'equation' in a later post.)

Are creatures then nothing at all? Has the simple God like Parmenides' Being swallowed the whole of reality? (More on this later.) 

I would like to accept the Thomist solution, but I am afraid I cannot. If God exists in every possible world, and God is identical to his willing creatures in every possible world, then creatures exist in every possible world -- which  contradicts our assumption that creatures are contingent, i.e., existent in some but not all possible worlds.  To say that the contingency of creatures resides in their ontological imperfection seems to involve a fudging of two distinct senses of contingency:

X is modally contingent (to give it a name) iff x is possible to be and possible not to be. (This is equivalent to: existent in some but not all possible worlds.)

X is ontologically contingent (to give it a name) iff x is radically imperfect in its mode of being and not ontologically necessary (not self-subsistent, simple, purely actual, eternal etc.)

Now if creatures exist at all -- which may be doubted if God + creatures = God -- then they must be contingent in both senses, But then our problem is up and running and the Thomist solution avails nothing. Contingency of creatures in the second sense cannot be read back into God, but modal contingency of creatures can be.

Welcome to the aporetics of the Absolute.

Comments

[Roger]

“The question is whether whatever God wills, he wills necessarily. If so, then God's willing creatures into existence is a necessary willing despite the creatures being contingent.”

If God is both eternal (Psalm 33:11; 90:2) and immutable (Malachi 3:6; James 1:17), as Scripture plainly teaches, then it necessarily follows that His will to create the world in which we live was necessary or non-contingent. Thus, in this sense, God’s creatures are not modally contingent or “possible to be and possible not to be.”

“If God exists in every possible world, and God is identical to his willing creatures in every possible world, then creatures exist in every possible world -- which contradicts our assumption that creatures are contingent, i.e., existent in some but not all possible worlds.”

But God doesn’t exist “in every possible world,” since the only possible world is the actual world that He has eternally and immutably willed to exist. Thus, the assumption that creatures are “existent in some but not all possible worlds” is a mistaken assumption. Creatures are only contingent in the ontological sense (i.e., not eternal, self-subsistent, etc.).

[BV]

Thanks for the comment, Roger.

I agree with your first comment if divine simplicity is an entailment of God's eternity and immutability. The entailment, I think, needs to be explicitly argued for.

Your second comment appears to betray a confusion between 'world' as this term is used in the 'possible worlds' semantics of modal discourse and concrete universe. 'God exists in every possible world' unpacks 'God is a necessary being.'

Now suppose there is only one possible world. Then that world would be both actual and necessary. If God exists in every possible world, then of course he exists in that world.

You seem to be maintaining that, no matter how things might have been, creatures would have existed. But that is not classical theism. On the latter, God could not have failed to exist, but he could have existed without creating anything.

My thesis is that Aquinas hasn't solved the problem. The problem, again, is to render intelligible how a God who wills what he wills necessarily can have creatures that are merely (modally) contingent. Either God is simple, in which case creatures are necessary; or creatures are contingent in which case God is not simple. It's as 'simple' as that! Either way classical theism is in trouble.

[Roger]

“I agree with your first comment if divine simplicity is an entailment of God's eternity and immutability. The entailment, I think, needs to be explicitly argued for.”

If by “divine simplicity” you mean the identity of God’s nature with each of His properties, I fail to see how that is relevant. Scripture clearly teaches that God is eternal and His will immutable. Thus, it necessarily follows that He has always willed to create the actual world in which we live and there was never any possibility that He willed to create something else. That logically follows whether or not God’s nature is simple or a complex of distinct properties.

“You seem to be maintaining that, no matter how things might have been, creatures would have existed. But that is not classical theism. On the latter, God could not have failed to exist, but he could have existed without creating anything.”

I believe classical theism is correct on the first point and wrong on the second. God could not have failed to exist because He is eternal – “Even from everlasting to everlasting, You are God” (Psalm 90:2). But the speculative notion that God “could have existed without creating anything” contradicts the scriptural teaching that His will is immutable. If God is eternal and His will immutable, it necessarily follows He has always willed to create the actual world in which we live and there was never any possibility that He willed to create an alternate reality. If He could have willed an alternate reality, then His will would not in fact be immutable.

The problem, again, is to render intelligible how a God who wills what he wills necessarily can have creatures that are merely (modally) contingent. Either God is simple, in which case creatures are necessary; or creatures are contingent in which case God is not simple. It's as 'simple' as that! Either way classical theism is in trouble.

Again, I don’t believe the doctrine of divine simplicity is relevant. Since God is eternal and His will immutable, it necessarily follows that His will to create the world in which we live was necessary or non-contingent. This is true whether or not His nature is simple or a complex of distinct attributes. Therefore, God’s creatures are not modally contingent (“possible to be and possible not to be”), but only contingent in the ontological sense (“not eternal, self-subsistent, etc.”).