This is the third in a series on Lowe's presentism. It has two prerequisites. Here is the first entry; here is the second.
We have seen that for E. J. Lowe, temporal passage is real, objective, mind-independent. Temporal passage "consists in the continual coming into and going out of existence of entities . . . ." ("Presentism and Relativity," 137) Lowe insists more than once that the italicized phrases are to be taken seriously and literally: what passes out of existence is absolutely annihilated. A thing's ceasing to be present, and becoming (wholly) past is an existential change that reduces the thing to utter nonexistence.
What Lowe is telling us is that a correct metaphysics must take the ordinary language locution 'ceases to exist' to mean that what becomes wholly past becomes nothing at all. It cannot be taken to mean that what has become wholly past exists in some sense but at an earlier temporal location. For if that were so, the wholly past would not be absolutely annihilated. Similarly with other ordinary language expressions such as 'no longer exists.' For Lowe, what no longer exists is nothing at all. It has been annihilated by the passage of time.
One ought to find this puzzling. Scollay Square, to invoke my favorite example, did exist, and we know that it did. We also know that what did exist is different from what never existed. That is an obvious distinction that must be accommodated by any adequate theory of time. Can Lowe accommodate it?
Perhaps we can make some headway with this question by distinguishing between absolute and relative annihilation.
AA. X is absolutely annihilated by the passage of time iff said passage brings it about that x ceases to exist in such a way that after x ceases to exist there is no distinction between x's having existed and x's never having existed.
RA. X is relatively annihilated by the passage of time iff said passage brings it about that x, upon ceasing to exist, is nothing now or at present.
It seems to me that (AA) is what we ought to mean when we speak of absolute annihilation. For what the phrase suggests is a reduction to nonbeing that is unconditional. Absolute annihilation is the ultimate in annihilation. Imagine that there are no constraints, logical or non-logical, on divine power: God can do anything. If so, he can bring it about that Socrates never existed despite his having existed. God would then have the power, not to re-write history, but the power to 're-write' that of which history is the record. That would be a type of absolute annihilation.
Of course, I am not saying that God has this power, or that the passage of time has this power. I am not even saying that it is really possible that anything have this power of absolute annihilation. To the contrary! Given that Socrates existed, I say that there is no power on earth or in heaven that can 'undo' this fact. (Similarly for his having drunk the hemlock: given that he drank hemlock, there is no power that can bring it about that he never drank hemlock.) All I am saying is that (AA) is what we ought to mean by 'absolute annihilation' if we are to use that phrase seriously and precisely.
Given the above definition of 'absolute annihilation,' I say to Lowe: the passage of time, which we assume is mind-independently real in opposition to all B-theories of time, does not have the power of absolute annihilation; it has only the power of relative annihilation. I say this because I take it to be a non-negotiable datum that (i) what did exist is different from what never existed, and (ii) what did exist cannot be retroactively consigned to absolute nonexistence, and (iii) what ceases to exist, when it ceases to exist, does not become something that never existed. (Corollary: when a contingent being, and thus a possible being, ceases to exist, it does not, upon ceasing to exist, become an impossible being.)
So all Lowe is entitled to say is that what ceases to exist is relatively annihilated by the passage of time: said passage brings it about that the thing, upon ceasing to exist, is nothing now or at present. It is nothing now, but it was something yesterday, and so it cannot be the case that it is now nothing at all. It retains some sort of reality. It is difficult to say exactly in what the reality of the past consists; but the past is real. Lowe cannot accommodate the reality of the past.
The Argument Summarized
1) What was is not the same as what never was.
2) The wholly past was.
Therefore
3) It is not the case that the wholly past never was. (1,2)
4) If temporal passage brings about the absolute annihilation of the present and its contents, as per (AA), then it is the case that the wholly past never was.
Therefore
5) Temporal passage does not bring about the absolute annihilation of the present and its contents. (3, 4)
Therefore
6) Lowe's presentism is untenable: it is not the case that what passes out of existence is absolutely annihilated.
7) On the other hand, if the passage of time effects merely a relative annihilation of the present and its contents, as per (RA), then triviality results: if a thing, ceasing to exist, is relatively annihilated, then the thing is now nothing. But this is trivially true. If what exists, exists now, then the wholly past, which by definition does not exist now, does not exist.
Therefore
8) Lowe's presentism is either untenable or trivial.
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