After MacIntyre: On Deriving Ought from Is

Are there any (non-trivial*) valid arguments that satisfy the following conditions:  (i) The premises are all purely factual  in the sense of purporting to state only what is the case; (ii) the conclusion is normative/evaluative?  Alasdair MacIntyre gives the following example (After Virtue, U. of Notre Dame Press, 1981, p. 55):

1. This watch is inaccurate.

Therefore

2. This is a bad watch.

MacIntyre claims that the premise is factual, the conclusion evaluative, and the argument valid.  (The argument is an enthymeme the formal validity of which is ensured by the auxiliary premise, 'Every inaccurate watch is a bad watch.') The validity is supposed to hinge on the functional character of the concept watch.  A watch is an artifact created by an artificer for a specific purpose: to tell time accurately.  It therefore has a proper function, one assigned by the artificer.  (Serving as a paperweight being an example of an improper function.)  A good watch does its job, serves its purpose, fulfills its proper function. MacIntyre tells us that "the concept of a watch cannot be defined independently of the concept of a good watch . . ." and that "the criterion of something's being a watch and something's being a good watch . . . are not independent of each other." (ibid.)  MacIntyre goes on to say that both criteria are factual and that for this reason arguments like the one above validly move from a factual premise to an evaluative conclusion.

Speaking as someone who has been more influenced by the moderns than by the ancients, I don't see it.  It is not the case that "the concept of a watch cannot be defined independently of the concept of a good watch . . . ."  A watch is "a portable timepiece designed to be worn (as on the wrist) or carried in the pocket." (Merriam-Webster)  This standard definition allows, as it should, for both good and bad watches.   Note that if chronometric goodness, i.e., accuracy, were built into the definition of 'watch,' then no watch would ever need repair.  Indeed, no watch could be repaired. For a watch needing repair would then not be a watch.

MacIntyre is playing the following game, to put it somewhat uncharitably.

He smuggles the evaluative attribute good into his definition of 'watch,' forgets that he has done so thereby generating the illusion that his definition is purely factual, and then pulls the evaluative rabbit out of the hat in his conclusion.  It is an illusion since the rabbit was already there in the premise.  In other words, both (1) and (2) are evaluative.  So, while the argument is valid, it is not a valid argument from a purely factual premise to an evaluative conclusion.

So if the precise question is whether one can validly move from a purely factual or descriptive premise to an evaluative conclusion, then MacIntyre's example fails to show that this is possible.

What MacIntyre needs is the idea that some statements are both factual and evaluative.  If (1) is both, then (2) -- This is a bad watch -- follows and  MacIntyre gets what he wants.  But if (1) is both, then (1) is not purely factual. The question, however, was whether there is a valid immediate inference from the purely factual to the normative/evaluative.  The answer to that, pace MacIntyre, is in the negative.

Is Man a Functional Concept?

But now suppose that, with respect to functional concepts, the move from fact to value is logically kosher because functional concepts embed criteria of evaluation.  Then this discussion is relevant to ethics, the normative study of human action,  only if man is a functional concept.  Aristotle maintains as much:  man qua man has a proper function, a proper role, a proper 'work' (ergon).  This proper function is one he has essentially, by his very nature, regardless of whatever contingent roles a particular human may instantiate, wife, father, sea captain.  Thus, " 'man' stands to 'good man' as 'watch' stands to 'good watch' . . . ." (56)  Now if man qua man has a proper and essential function, then to say of a particular man that he is good or bad is to imply that he has a proper and essential function.  But then to call a man good is also to make a factual statement.  (57)

The idea is that being human is a role that includes certain norms, a role that each of us necessarily instantiates whether like it or not.  There is a sort of coalescence of factual individual and norm in the case of each human being just as, in Aristotle's ontology, there is a sort of coalescence of individual and nature in each primary substance. 

But does man qua man have a proper role or function?  The moderns fight shy of this notion.  They tend to  think of all roles, jobs, and functions of humans as freely adopted and contingent.  Modern man likes to think of himself as a free and autonomous individual who exists prior to and apart from all roles.  This is what Sartre means when he says that existence precedes essence:  Man qua man has no pre-assigned nature or essence or proper function: man as existing individual makes himself what ever he becomes.  Man is not God's artifact, hence has no function other than one he freely adopts.

Although Aristotle did not believe in a creator God, it is an important question whether an Aristotle-style healing of the fact-value rift requires classical theism as underpinning. MacIntyre seems to think so. (Cf. p. 57)  Philippa Foot demurs.

Interim Conclusion

If the precise question is whether one can validly (but non-trivially) move from a purely factual or descriptive premise to an evaluative conclusion, I have yet to see a clear example of this.  But one ought to question the strict bifurcation of fact and value.  The failure of entailment is perhaps no surprise given the bifurcation.  The Aristotelian view, despite its murkiness, remains a contender.  But to be a contender is not to be a winner.

The Aristotelian view is murky because it seems to imply that a bad man is not a man, just as a bad watch is not a watch.  If it is built into the concept watch that it tell time accurately, then a watch that is either slow or fast is not  watch, which is plainly false if not absurd, implying as it does that no watch could ever need repair.  Clearly, there is nothing in the concept watch to require that a watch be accurate.  There are good watches and bad watches. Similarly, there are good men and bad men. If to be a man is to exercise the proper function of a man, then there would be no need for correctional institutions.

___________________

*A trivial argument from 'is' to 'ought' exploits the explosion principle, i.e., ex contradictione quodlibet.  If anything follows from a contradiction, then from a contradictory premise set of factual claims any normative claim follows.

Comments

[AleksinGrigory]

I think you are incorrect in your critique. It seems to me that you confuse (i) the purpose of the watch with (ii) the fulfillment of the purpose of the watch. The way that a watch can be distinguished from a bracelet is that a part of the watch's essence is its purpose, namely that of "accurately telling the time." If a watch fails to fulfill its purpose, it thereby does not cease to be a watch, rather it attains a second-order property of having an unfulfilled purpose. Hence, if we distinguish the essential property of having a given purpose and the fulfillment of that purpose, then MacIntyre's argument seems to work, assuming that goodness is identified with purpose fulfillment. Hence a watch with an unfulfilled purpose, for example if it is inaccurate, is considered a bad watch.

For persons this has a interesting consequence because people are able to self-fulfill their purposes. Thus, perhaps, ethics can be considered to supervene on the extent and ability of any given person to self-fulfill their objective purpose.

[Frank]

What's a timepiece?

And don't you equivocate between having the function of being accurate and succeeding in being accurate?

[BV]

Aleksin,

Thanks for the response. You wrote,

>> The way that a watch can be distinguished from a bracelet is that a part of the watch's essence is its purpose, namely that of "accurately telling the time." If a watch fails to fulfill its purpose, it thereby does not cease to be a watch, rather it attains a second-order property of having an unfulfilled purpose.<<

We of course agree that a watch is a timepiece, a device typically worn on the wrist, the purpose of which is to tell time. But you smuggled 'accurately' into the definition. Now it is a plain fact the some watches are accurate and some are not. Therefore, by your definition a slow or fast (i.e. inaccurate) watch is not a watch.

If the purpose of a watch is accurately to tell time, then a device that does not accurately tell time cannot be a watch. Since that is plainly false, you must not import the evaluational/normative term, 'accurate' into your definition of 'watch.' And if you don't make this mistake, then you cannot validly infer (2) from (1).

[BV]

Aleksin,

1. This watch is inaccurate.

Therefore

2. This is a bad watch.

(2) is clearly evaluative. BV and AM agree on this.

BV says: the argument is valid only if (1) is evaluative. (1) is evaluative, ergo the argument is valid. But this does not show that one can validly infer an evaluative claim from a factual claim.

AM says: The argument is valid, and (1) is factual, ergo, one can validly infer an evaluative claim from a factual claim.

BV says further that BV is right!

[BV]

Aleksin,

You distinguish between purpose and fulfillment of purpose. Good distinction! We agree as to what the purpose of a watch is, and we agree that some watches do not fulfill their purpose. So far, so good.

Now suppose I judge that my watch is inaccurate and I express my judgment verbally: 'This watch is inaccurate!' Is my statement evaluative or factual? It is clearly evaluative. I am measuring my watch against a standard of chronometric accuracy.

To generalize: whenever we say of a thing with a purpose that it fails to fulfill its purpose, we are evaluating, not stating a mere fact.

Of course, it is true that my watch is inaccurate, but a true statement is not the same as a factual statement as 'factual' is being used in this context.

'Fact' and 'factual' are polysemous.

[BV]

Frank,

I believe what I said in response to Aleksin applies also to your comment. Thanks for making it and Happy New Year to both of you.

[AleksinGrigory]

BV,

Thank you for your response and Happy New Year! I admit that I have a made a few inaccuracies. Allow me to rephrase my answer. My point is that:

(1) A watch is a device that is worn on one's wrist and has the purpose of accurately telling the time

is not the same as:

(2) A watch is a device that is worn on one's wrist and accurately tells the time

Whereas (2) entails that an inaccurate watch is not a watch, (1) does not.
To put it even more simply. My definition of a watch would be a modification of (1):

(1*) A watch is a device that is worn on one's wrist and ought to accurately tell the time in order to be a good watch

I agree though, that my definitions do include evaluative judgements namely of what makes a watch good. So in the end, I have to agree that MacIntyre's argument does not work out.

Grigory

P.S. On an unrelated note, do you think it is plausible to speak of non-essential but necessary properties of individuals? Although it would seem superfluous in most cases, I wonder whether God would have no metaphysical composition yet had necessary properties entailed by His 'simple' essence. Perhaps they would only be Cambridge properties though.

[BV]

Grigory,

I see what you are saying.

D1. P is a non-essential property of x =df x can exist without instantiating P.

D2. P is a necessary property of x =df x cannot exist without instantiating P.

On these definitions there are no non-essential but necessary properties of individuals.

[Elliott]

It seems to me that MacIntyre’s enthymeme is somewhat imprecise with respect to "bad." Arguably, there’s a difference between intrinsic and instrumental value. The term “inaccurate” suggests that (1) is evaluative in the instrumental sense. An accurate watch acquires instrumental value via its successful use as a timepiece; an inaccurate watch has instrumental disvalue (i.e., badness).

Perhaps this rendering of the argument helps to clarify that (1) is evaluative.

1. This watch is inaccurate.
2. Every inaccurate watch is an instrumentally bad watch.
Therefore,
3. This is an instrumentally bad watch.

As Bill noted, the attribute of (instrumental) value is present in (1).

Some watches are instrumentally good and others instrumentally bad. A watch is not by definition good. Generally: a tool is not by definition instrumentally good.

[Bill]

This speaks to an underlying flaw in the Aristotelian idea that the essence
of a thing can somehow be fully captured in a definition that includes that substance and excludes other substances. For example, humans are said to be "rational animals" by definition. But that does not imply all of what a human should be!

Is the full nature and form of a substance captured by precise classification?

Unfortunately, a medieval idea of cognition as involving the grasping of abstract essences by a rational soul was taken to also mean that one can grasp the proper nature of something though mere understanding of the proper substance classification of such an object of thought.

Do I, by understanding of the __definition__ of what a watch is, grasp what a good watch should be? No more than I grasp in a definition how to build or repair a watch. Those things require an understanding of aspects of function and structure that is far beyond mere classification.

[Michael Brazier]

Macintyre's argument was that, once you define being good as being a complete example of the kind of thing one is, the statement that something is of a certain kind ("this is a watch") necessarily entails normative judgements of that thing. Those judgements are distinct from what the thing is, but they can't be denied once one recognizes what it is.

So, for instance, the ideal measuring device is one that measures to an infinite precision. A watch that isn't accurate fails to exemplify that ideal; a watch that doesn't run fails even more drastically. The statements "these are watches", "this watch loses time" and "this watch is broken" are all factual; but the first implies a standard, while the second and third entail that the watches fall short of that standard.

The normative premise here is, then, "a thing ought to be completely the kind of thing it is"; everything ought to fulfill its nature and essence. Of course it's better to state it than to leave it out. But it's kind of hard to object to it, unless you deny that things have inherent natures (as Hume in fact did.)