Existence as Completeness? Gilson on Scotus, Thomas, and the Real Distinction

I composed this entry with Lukáš Novák in mind. I hope to secure his comments.

...........................

Marco Santambrogio, "Meinongian Theories of Generality," Nous, December 1990, p. 662:

. . . I take existence to mean just this: an entity, i, exists iff there is a determinate answer to every question concerning it or in other words, for every F(x) either F[x/i] or ~F[x/i] holds.  The Tertium Non Datur is the hallmark of existence or reality.  This is entirely in the Meinong-Twardowski tradition.

In other words, existence is complete determinateness or completeness: Necessarily, for any x, x exists if and only if x is complete, i.e., satisfies the property version of the Law of Excluded Middle (tertium non datur).  Now I have long maintained that whatever exists is complete, but I have never been tempted by the thesis that whatever is complete exists.  My intuitions on this matter are Thomistic rather than Scotistic.

According to Etienne Gilson, Duns Scotus held that actually to exist in reality = to be complete:

. . . actual existence appears only when an essence is, so to speak, bedecked with the complete series of its determinations. (Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute, Toronto, 1952, 2nd ed. , 89)

Actual existence thus appears as inseparable from the essence when essence is taken in its complete determination. (88)

An actually existing essence is, meaning by "is" that it exists, as soon as it is fully constituted by its genus, its species, its own individual "thisness," as well as all the accidents which go to make up its being. (86)

It follows that an actually existing thing is not the result of the superaddition of existence to a complete essence, but is just an essence in its completeness. This implies that there is no distinctio realis. For if an actually existing individual essence exists in virtue of being completely determinate, then there cannot be any distinction in reality between that complete essence and its existence. If Socrates is a wholly determinate essence, then, on the Scotist view as glossed by Gilson, there is no need for anything more to make him exist: nothing needs to be added ab extra.

What we have here are two very different theories of existence.  For the Scotist, existence belong in the order of essence as the maximal determinateness of essence.  For the Thomist, existence does not belong in the order of essence but is situated 'perpendicular' to it. Is there any way rationally to decide between these views? Could there be complete nonexistent objects? If yes, then the Scotist view would stand refuted.  If no, then the Thomist view would stand refuted.

Well, why can't there be complete nonexistent objects?  Imagine the God of Leibniz, before the creation, contemplating an infinity of possible worlds, each of them determinate down to the last detail.  None of them exists or is actual.  But each of them is complete.  One of them God calls 'Charley.'  God says, Fiat Charley! And Charley exists.  It is exactly the same world which 'before' was merely possible, but 'now'  is actual.  The difference is not one of essence, but one of existence.

So, while existence entails completeness, why should completeness entail existence?  

(Other questions arise at this point which are off-topic, for example, why Charley over Barley?  Why Charley over any other world?  Must God have a reason?  And what would it be?  Would it be because Charley is the best of all possible worlds?  Is there such a things as the BEST of all possible worlds?  Why some world rather than no world?  And so on. But these questions are off-topic.  Focus like a laser on the question about the 'nature' of existence.) 

The theological imagery is supposed to help you understand the ontological point.  But we needn't bring God into it. It would also not be to the point to protest that God creates out of nothing, not out of mere possibles.  My concern here is with the nature of existence, not with the nature of  God or of divine creation. All I need for my argument is the possibility that there be maximally determinate individual essences that do not exist.  If there are, then existence is not completeness.  But one man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens. Can either side refute the other?

In the end the dispute may come down to a profound and irresolvable difference in intuitions. 

What say you, Dr. Novak?

Comments

[Lukáš Novák]

Bill,

I am honoured to be invited to reply.

First of all, I think Gilson provides a distorted notion of Scotism. Scotus most certainly does not think that completeness is identical to, or implies, existence. The essence-existece identity thesis in Scotus means that in an existing being, to exist is to actually have one's essence. But there also are potential essnces, exactly as fully determined (down to the individual difference) as actual essences -- except that they don't exist. They just aren't there at all, they are pure nothing. No esse essentiae or whatever.

However, and here Scotus's position starts to be really interesting, although they are pure nothing, they are knowable. Why they are knowable? Because they are actually known by God. How come they are known by God although they are not there? Because God's intellect does not depend on its object but vice versa. Therefore, God's intellect does not presuppose the intelligibility, let alone existence, of its objects, but "produces" their intelligibility (their existence is a matter not of his intellect but will). But by making the possible essences intelligible (which also involves making them possible, in the first place) does not involve imparting them any real ontological status: it just makes it possible for them to be known.

So, I heartily agree with you and with Scotus that there are fully-determined possibilia, barring that that commits me to any sort of metaphysical possibilism. I am, like Scotus, a metaphysical actualist (possibilia have no ontological status) but semantic possibilist (we can refer to the possibilia). I even believe that possibilia must be fully determined, because underdetermined objects are impossible.

What is controversial is, whether according to Aquinas there are fully determined possibilia. There are interpretations that ascribe to him the position that there are only specific possibilia, because individuality is connected to the actus essendi. I don't think Aquinas either clearly teaches or clearly rejects this, but I regard it as an incoherent position, for the reason given above.

[BV]

And I am honored to receive your reply!

There are two issues here, one historical-exegetical, the other systematic. I am of course primarily interested in the latter.

You seem to be implying that the distinguished Gilson has utterly failed to understand Scotus. That sounds unlikely, but I am inclined to defer to your historical expertise. Let me read the paper you sent me, and then we can discuss the systematic issues.

[ML]

"For if an actually existing individual essence exists in virtue of being completely determinate, then there cannot be any distinction in reality between that complete essence and its existence."

But either those determinations that constitute being completely determinate exist or not. But they cannot not exist, otherwise, they cannot constitute anything, much less being completely determinate. So they exist. But if they exist, then it is in virtue of existing that they constitute being completely determinate, and so the individual here exists in virtue of existence. At least this how the issue seems to me.