Maverick Philosopher

Why I Want to Live Long

I want to live a long life so as to be able to experience and reflect upon this predicament of ours from every humanly possible temporal perspective. For each age of life has its characteristic insights and illusions.  Youth has its truth as midlife its crisis, a crisis risible to the man ten years beyond it: "What the hell was that all about?" 

And as the years roll on, and the fire down below subsides, certain insights become possible which were not possible before. The young man's dong is a magic wand that conjures and weaves the web of maya the better to ensnare him and keep him tied to the transient. The old man who makes good use of his old age sloughs off the illusions of earthly love that were always more hydraulic in provenance than pneumatic.  He now has a good shot at moral and spiritual improvement. But will he take it?

Or will he essay to prolong his dong and with it the web of lies it weaves? Nothing is more pitiful than the decrepit oldster who keeps himself jacked up Hefner-style.  But despite the Viagra and the nubile nymphs cavorting for his delectation, poor Hef could not rise to the occasion and was reduced to manual mode. 

Live long for the end of life's day in wait for the the owl of Minerva who spreads her wings at dusk.  There are still things to be learned and things to be done that can only be learned and done here below.   As for you workers in the vineyards of Wissenschaft,  "Die Erntejahren eines Gelehrten kommen spät," as I once heard Hans-Georg Gadamer say.  "A scholar's harvest years come late."

On whether an individual is identical to its existence

This just over the transom:

Good day Dr. Vallicella,

 

I was reading your book on existence, and on page 71, there is this argument for the real distinction between an individual's essence and its existence:

 

"[I]f in a essence and existence are identical, then a's essence entails a's existence. But that is to say that a is a necessary being... [this] implies that every individual is a necessary being, which is absurd."

 

I've reconstructed this as follows, and it seems one can object to premise (2):

 

(1) If a's existence is identical to a's essence, then a's essence entails a's existence. 

(2) If a's essence entails X, then a is necessarily X. 

(3) Therefore, if a's existence = a's essence, then a necessarily exists. 

(4) a is a contingent being. 

(5) No contingent being can exist necessarily. 

(6) Therefore, a's existence is not identical to a's essence.

 

(2) seems ambiguous. We can say that a can be necessarily X absolutely or conditionally. Put in terms of possible worlds, a is necessarily X absolutely if a is X in all possible worlds, while a is necessarily X conditionally if a is X only in all worlds where a exists. 

 

BV: I accept your distinction, but I would couch it in different terms, terms in keeping with standard practice. Let the free variable 'x' range over individuals.  To say that x is essentially F (where 'F' is a predicate that picks out a property) is to say that x is F in every possible world in which x exists. To say that x is accidentally F is to say that x is F in some, but not all, of the possible worlds in which x exists. To say that x is necessarily F is to say that (i) x is essentially F, and that (ii) x exists in every possible world.  

If we read (2) in terms of absolute necessity, then (2) is false–just because a triangle's essence entails being three-sided, it doesn't follow that triangles exist in all possible worlds. 

 

BV:  If you are talking about  particular  material triangles, a triangular piece of metal for example, then it it is true that they do not exist in all worlds.  And this despite the fact that every triangle is essentially three-sided.  But what I mean by the essence of a concrete contingent individual such as a triangular piece of metal is the whatness or quiddity of that very individual minus its existence. Recall that I distinguish between wide and narrow senses of 'essence' on p. 68:

 

'Essence' is here employed in a wide sense to denote the conjunction of those properties that make up what a thing is, and not in the narrow sense according to which a thing's essential (as opposed to accidental) properties are those it cannot fail to possess. Thus in the wide sense of 'essence' being sunburned now is part of my essence, even though I might not have been sunburned now. Thus [both] narrowly essential and accidental properties (whether monadic or relational) are part of my wide essence. 

So consider that triangular piece of metal. It exists, and it exists contingently, which is to say -- avoiding possible worlds jargon -- that it is possibly such that it does not exist. It might not have existed: there is no metaphysical necessity that it exist.  But if the existence of x and the wide essence of x are one and the same -- as the 'no difference theory' implies -- then our triangular piece of metal exists just in virtue of its being what it is. That is equivalent to saying that its possibility entails its actuality, which is the definition of a necessary being. But that piece of metal is surely no necessary being. So I conclude that there is a real distinction between wide essence and existence in it and in every contingent being.  What I argue in the book is that the metaphysical contingency of a contingent being is rooted in the real distinction.

If we read (2) in terms of conditional necessity, then (2) is true–a triangle is three-sided only in worlds where it exists–but this would render (6) false, since something can exist necessarily in a conditional sense and still be a contingent being.

 

It is certainly true -- to put it my way -- that a thing can have an essential property and "still be a contingent being."  But this is not relevant to what I am saying.

 

You must bear in mind that I deny  that existence is a property where P is a property =_df P is possibly such that it is instantiated.   Your argument above seems to miss this important point. You seem to be assimilating existence to a property.  We rightly distinguish essential and accidental properties, but existence is neither an essential nor an accidental property.

 

The existence of x  is just too basic to be a property of  x, but not so basic as to be identical to x!

Is this a fair reconstruction of your argument, and if so, how can the above objection be addressed?

 

I would say that you haven't grasped by argument. Comments are enabled in case you have a rejoinder. 

 

Thank you for your time.

Best,

M. L. Pianist

 

Thank you for writing, M. L.