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Tuesday, June 28, 2022

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>Off in the brush I espied what appeared to be some big black dogs.

Which were black bears that you thought to be big dogs. This I understand.

>An initial appearance is shown to be a perceptual mistake

What does the noun phrase ‘An initial appearance’ refer to? To the bears? But then you say that this appearance, i.e. the bears, was a perceptual mistake. Or are you referring to something else?

> The initial, non-veridical appearance was not nothing

Clearly the bears were something.

> but its 'reality' was merely intra-mental

Surely the bears were extra mental?

I do not follow any of this. The things that appeared to be black dogs were in fact bears. The appearances WERE the bears.

I have been re-reading Prichard (his collection of essays on perception, and his commentary on Kant, which is excellent). He pays careful attention to the grammar of ‘appearing’ and its cognates.

>At Level Two, R1 is stripped of its secondary qualities, and left with its primary qualities alone.

But the tree is green. How can you possibly strip the greenness out of the tree?

Or are you saying that the colour is a sensation? But then you face the difficult problem I identified earlier , which you did not address. For colour is extended in space, and has a form, therefore if colour is a sensation, sensation is also extended in space, and also has a form.

Then, turning to your Level 3, how can the space that the colour-sensations occupy be 'inter subjective'? For the colour patch with its spatial form that I see, cannot be the same in number as the colour patch that F sees. Each of us must have our own separate space, spaces which can never be spatially connected, for no point in one can ever be contiguous with any point in the other.

Prichard: “After all there can be only one space, and if colours are in space they are in this one space which is at the same time the space in which bodies are, if there are bodies.”

“Off in the brush I espied what appeared to be some big black dogs”

In fact you espied some black bears, which appeared at first to be dogs. So you took some bears to be some dogs. Does that mean we have a three place predicate: took(you, bears, dogs)? No, because that implies the existence of some dogs, as well as some bears. But there were no dogs, only you and the bears. It’s not that you thought of some dogs that they were bears, rather, you thought of some bears, that they were dogs. My puzzle is then how you get to the object you call ‘A1’, the appearance. Are you saying that you thought, of some appearance , that it was a group of dogs? But what then of the veridical case, where you got closer and you now correctly took the bears to be bears? Were you still thinking of some appearance, which you now took to be bears? Or does the appearance vanish in the veridical case, i.e. there are only appearances in the illusory case?

It would help me a lot if you could answer these questions, because if you don’t, I have no way of understanding what you are referring to by ‘A1’, ‘R1’, ‘R2’ etc.

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