Here are four propositions that are individually plausible but collectively inconsistent.
1) For any x, temporal or atemporal, if x has a property, then x exists.
2) For any temporal x, if x exists, then x exists at present.
3) Frege, a temporal item, does not exist at present.
4) Frege has properties at present.
(1) is plausible: how could anything have a property if it is not 'there' to have it? This use of 'there' is non-locative. I assume that to exist = to be, and that Meinongian nonentities, "beyond being and nonbeing," are unintelligible.
(2) is plausible: the past is no longer, the future not yet; the present alone is real/existent! It is important to note, however, that the plausibility of (2) is not that of a tautology. Tautologies are plausible in excelsis; substantive metaphysical claims are not. One cannot reasonably controvert a tautology; one can reasonably controvert a substantive metaphysical claim. What (2) formulates, call it 'presentism,' is somewhat plausible but surely not logically true. So the senses of 'exist(s)' and 'exist(s) at present' are distinct. If I say that a thing exists, I say nothing about when it exists; I say only that it is 'there' in the non-locative sense among the 'furniture of the world.' Indeed, 'x exists' leaves open whether the thing is in time at all. 'God exists' is noncommittal on the question whether God is temporal or atemporal.
(3) is plausible: (a) Frege is temporal in that he cannot exist without existing in time; (b) Frege does not now exist.
(4) is plausible: Frege is now famous and he is dead. Those predicates are true of him: he has (instantiates) the properties they express.
The tetrad is collectively inconsistent. One way to solve the problem is by rejecting the least plausible proposition. By my lights, that proposition is (2). To reject (2) is to reject presentism. But if presentism is false, it does not follow that eternalism is true!
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