An Online Catalog of Theistic Arguments

Chad McIntosh writes,

I'd like to let you know about a project I've been working on for the past two years that I have just completed (for now): a fairly comprehensive, organized list and summary of theistic arguments. I hope it will be a useful resource.

https://www.camcintosh.com/theistic/index.html

I've also included at the very end (under META > Cumulative Case) a calculator that allows visitors to come up with their own estimate of the evidential power of the arguments.

The website is a little clunky, but serviceable (it is best as expanded window on desktop). Of course, I've included several of your arguments:

ONTOLOGICAL > Possibility Defenses > Kordig & Vallicella 
METAPHYSICAL > Facts
AXIOLOGICAL > Deontic Value > Modal Axiarchism 

I thought I should take a look at your book A Paradigm Theory of Existence with the intent to summarize it's main argument, but that's a hard book to get a hold of! There's also a similar argument just published by Christoph de Ray called "Existence Exists and it is God," in which he interacts with your book. I may integrate both yours and de Ray's arguments in a future update to the page. 

Great to hear from you, Chad. You've created an interesting and useful resource. The site is a bit clunky but it displays clearly and easily on my desktop and is easy to navigate. Thank you for your references to my work. As for my existence book, I'd send you a copy if I had one to spare. If someone reading this has a copy he would be willing to part with, please contact Chad. I don't recommend that you buy it; it is way overpriced, although on occasion the Amazon pricing algorithm goes haywire and the tome becomes relatively affordable.

Thanks also for referring me to Christophe de Ray, whose article I found here.  I will have to read it.

Let me make two minor comments on the material in the Prolegomena section. You define 'theistic argument' as follows:

Theistic arguments are arguments for (or the rationality of belief in or commitment to) the existence of a being with at least one God-like attribute, such as necessity, God-like power or knowledge, ground of morality, creator or designer of the natural world, and so on.

The first is that you need a second 'for' after 'or' in the parenthesis. The second is substantive. Suppose an entity has exactly one God-like attribute. I wouldn't call an argument for the existence of such an entity an argument for God given your definition of theism:

 Theism is the view that there is a personal God like that worshipped by Jews, Christians, and Muslims.

The Good of Plato, the One of Plotinus, the deus sive natura of Spinoza,  the objevktiver Geist of Hegel, and F. H. Bradley's Absolute, to mention just these five, are each such as to have one or more God-like attributes, but none of them are persons.  I have no objection to your definition of theism; my point is that it does not comport well with your definition of 'theistic arguments.' The latter is easily repaired, but I'll leave that to you.

Comments are enabled and invited.

Comments

[John]

I would politely disagree with Bill’s suggestion that you not purchase his book. It is indeed expensive, but I bought it about 2 years ago, and it was without doubt worth the money I spent on it. Fortunately, I was in a position to spend about $150 on a single book, but if you have the money, it’s absolutely worth it. When I read other work in analytic philosophy these days, I am often struck by the comparative lack of clarity and lack of interest in “the big questions”. If more work in analytic philosophy were like Bill’s, we’d all be much better off.

[BV]

That's very kind of you, John. The book has some serious flaws, as I would be the first to point out, so much so that I am contemplating a sort of re-do after I get this metaphilosophy book done. It'll happen this year, if body and soul stay attached. (I've been saying this for quite a few years now.)

I remember you, John; your comments were among the best I've ever received on this weblog. As I recall you have the doctorate from UVA and a few years ago moved West to start a career in IT. Send me a personal e-mail to let me know how it is going for you and how your philosophical work affects (if it does) your present job.

[John]

That’s very kind, Bill. I will certainly send you an email. I have several different email addresses and after a bit of digging, it appears that I missed one or two from you over the years. I shall reach out! My apologies.

[Christophe de Ray]

Hello,

Many thanks to Chad for drawing attention to my argument, and for this very helpful database. Bill (if I may), I have greatly benefited from reading your work over the years, and would be keenly interested to hear your thoughts on the paper, when you get to it.

Very best,
CDR

[BV]

CDR,

Good to hear from you. I will study your paper and perhaps write a post about it. And thank you for reading my work.

It occurs to me that your surname is a bit of an aptronym, reminiscent as it is of de re as opposed to de dicto.

OTher aptronyms in philosophy: Jack Smart, John Wisdom, Gerald Vision. Examples are easily multiplied beyond necessity. There used to be, perhaps still is, a knee specialist at Massachusetts General Hospital who rejoiced under the name, 'Dr Patella.'

Nomen est omen.

Some hypothesize nominative determinism, but I wouldn't go that far.

[Christophe de Ray]

Ha! I once heard of an Italian physician named 'Salvatore'. That's as far as my experience with aptronyms goes. But it's possible that I'm just not paying enough attention.