The Analysis of Qualia

London Ed sends the following for our rumination and delectation:

       This is not mine (Lycan's). But it is tricky:

1) Bertie is experiencing a green thing.

2) Suppose that there is no physical green thing outside Bertie’s head. But

3) There is no physical green thing inside Bertie’s head either.

4) If it is physical, the green thing is either outside Bertie’s head or inside it. Thus,

5) The green thing is not physical. [1,2,3,4] Thus,

6) Bertie’s experience contains a nonphysical thing. [1,5] Thus,

7) Bertie’s experience is not, or not entirely, physical. [6]

The argument seem to presuppose an act-object analysis of experiencing. Accordingly, there is the experiencing and there is that which is experienced, a green item, a green quale.  If the quale is not physical, then the experiencing is not, or is not entirely, physical.   The argument goes through. But then the experiencing cannot be a brain process (which I think is what Bill Lycan would want to maintain).

On an adverbial analysis of experiencing, however, it may be possible to uphold the view that experiencings are brain processes.   Accordingly, my sensing a green quale is my sensing green-ly. Thus there is no green object that appears: 'green' functions here not as an adjective that modifies a noun, but as an adverb that modifies the present progressive form of the verb 'to experience.'

The main problem with the adverbial analysis is that it gets the phenomenology wrong. If I see a green item, I see something that is green.  I do not see a green sensing or a sensing-greenly. This is so even if the green something I see does not exist! Ed will baulk here given that he upholds the dubious thin theory of existence. But surely I do not see a sensing-greenly, whatever that might mean. And that is the second problem. The locution 'sense-greenly' just makes no sense, unless it is replaceable salva significatione with 'sense something green.' The point is that 'sense-greenly' has no independent or irreducible sense. Since it does not, the adverbial theory is a non-starter.

'She ate quiche' makes sense, and so does 'She ate quickly.' But she ate-quiche-ly' means nothing unless it is a weird way of saying 'She ate quiche.'

Once again we seem to have landed in an aporetic 'pickle.'

Comments

[Joe Odegaard]

For what it's worth (I am not trained in philosophy) here are my thoughts as a designer; you may have some fun with them. I think they relate to the post above. If there is a big hole in the sequence below, I would love to have it pointed out. Ahem:

1) Joe is designing a new, untested green thing.

2) The new green thing is not anywhere at all in the physical world, yet.

3) There is no new physical green thing inside Joe's head, either.

4) The green thing being designed yet has some sort of manipulable proto-existence from which it can be made in the physical world.

5) Thus, things which are not physical can yet exist.

6) Since Joe is not God, he is not creating the new, untested green thing out of nothing. (Actually, the older I get the more I think that when I design something, I am not creating; there is sort of a channel & things come through it).

7) Thus there seems to be a non-physical realm below the Creator but above our physical existence.

Have at it, O philosophers !

[ozzie]

Broadly agree. Note that the adverbial theory originated with Ducasse (“Moore’s Refutation of Idealism” in Schilpp, The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, 1942, 223-51), who directed it at Moore’s sense-datum theory, as follows:

The considerations I shall set forth ... will not constitute an argument for idealism, ... its effect will not be to open the way for idealism; but only, on the one hand, to rob of its basis the kind of realism Professor Moore's article has been used to support, and on the other and chiefly, to make clear that certain facts do belong to Mind, which that realism rejects from Mind (ibid p.226)

Note the last bit.

[BV]

Yes, the adverbial theory begins with Curt Ducasse at Brown and was further developed by his student Roderick Chisholm, also at Brown. Or were there anticipations before Ducasse?

But do you agree that the adverbial theory is a non-starter? I can't resist the following pun. 'Broadly agree' in which 'briadly' functions adverbially, suggests 'agree about broads' where 'broads' is a plural now adjectivally modified by, etc.

[BV]

Hi Joe,

That's good; you are starting to think like a philosopher. But you are not addressing the exact point that we are are discussing, which is the ontological status and nature of a green quale. Of course I cannot expect you to know how we are using 'quale' and its plural 'qualia.' An example would be a green after-image(after staring at some bright light or brightly lit thing outside my head). The green after-image does not exist outside or inside my head. And yet it is not nothing: it is a definite something. More importantly it is an ACTUAL, not a merely possible, item. What you are talking about, however, is a merely possible item that you are planning to bring into existence. That is a different problem about which I may something later.

[BV]

Typos above, but my meaning comes through. Pressed for time! No job. no kids, no social entanglements, NO TIME! Enough money, but not enough time!

[ozzie ostrich]

>But do you agree that the adverbial theory is a non-starter?

Yes, which was why I said "broadly agree". It's a terrible theory. More later, I want to hear from Brightly, who I believe likes it.

[Joe Odegaard]

It might be worth thinking about the difference between discovery and invention.

[David Brightly]

I'm attracted to the adverbial account precisely because it moves away from talk of objects. The problem is that sight has a much higher spatial resolution than touch, hearing, smell, in descending order. The adverbial account works much better in the latter modes. For vision you have to imagine yourself in free fall inside a cavernous opaque sphere on which light is uniformly projected. There are then no objects to see, but there is colour, and 'I sense greenly' captures this aspect of the phenomenology. I don't think an adverbialist is claiming to 'see a green-sensing'. Rather he sees a mere 'hint' towards an object. Given enough 'hints' his vision may 'synthesise', ie, bring to consciousness, an object. This, for example.

Lycan rejects adverbialism on the ground that it is a 'semantical thesis about the logical forms of sensation statements, and as such it has been severely and tellingly criticized'. Maybe we are at the limit of what is sayable and can go no further.

[oz the ostrich]

A further point. Does the word ‘greenness’ signify (1) reflectance properties of the surfaces of leaves, avocados etc? Or (2) the stimulation of the visual cortex caused by such properties or (3) “greenness as I see it”, i.e. “phenomenal greenness”?

Against the first, it is well known that the cortical stimulation does not correspond closely to the reflectance properties, but does correspond closely to the responses of subjects asked to say whether they experience greenness or not. Against the second, the visual cortex is not green, as Lycan well notes. Against the third, there is no existent corresponding to phenomenal greenness, at least for materialists. The puzzle remains.

Brightly posted a picture of a dalmation, I believe. But this is the image of a dog, which is not a dog but rather the image of a dog. The image supports my contention that ‘somethingness’, aka haecceity, the perception of a hoc aliquid, a this-something, is part of our representation of reality. This is against those like Locke and Berkeley who thought there was no “idea” corresponding to haecceity, and that all ideas are universals, not particulars.

As Bill says, the locution ‘sense-greenly’ just makes no sense, unless it is replaceable salva significatione with ‘sense something green’. My emphasis.

[Joe Odegaard]

"Greenness" might be taken to signify (4) electro-magnetic waves with a wavelength of between 495 nanometers and 570 nanometers, which is a more precise definition than (3), what people say they see: my grandpa Cass was colorblind, he could not tell red from green, and he cheated on the test to get into the army in WW1. But I think (4) was arrived at by averaging people's responses to (3). Color-blindness throws an interesting light (ha ha) on this question.

[joe Odegaard]

Note that the perceived color "brown" has no corresponding light wavelength.

[oz the logical ostrich]

May also be of interest: "Perhaps the clearest version of this argument [against physicalism] is Jackson’s knowledge argument; see qualia: the knowledge argument. This argument asks us to imagine Mary, a famous neuroscientist confined to a black and white room. Mary is forced to learn about the world via black and white television and computers. However, despite these hardships Mary learns (and therefore knows) all that physical theory can teach her. Now, if physicalism were true, it is plausible to suppose that Mary knows everything about the world. And yet — and here is Jackson’s point — it seems she does not know everything."
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#CaseAgaiPhysIQualCons

[OZ]

This presentation by Jeff Speaks https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/2009-10/93507/_HANDOUTS/metaphysics-color.pdf sums up all the relevant positions as of now. No one should comment on this thread again until they have read every single paper he refers to. Also, every paper referred to each of those papers.

[oz]

Sorry, another problem. Red light has wavelength of 620-750nm, green light of about 510nm.

It is perfectly possible for a surface to reflect light of both red and green wavelengths. But it is impossible (as Wittgenstein and more recently Johnston noted), for the surface of an object to be both phenomenally green and red at the same time. (I'm afraid I had to use the word phenomenally there, apologies).

[David Brightly]

Ed says,

cortical stimulation [...] does correspond closely to the responses of subjects asked to say whether they experience greenness or not [...] Against the third, there is no existent corresponding to phenomenal greenness, at least for materialists.'

Aren't these statements in contradiction?

But I agree there is still a puzzle. We know that the visual cortex makes 'corrections' of various kinds. Eg, here. Why do subjects' responses correlate more with stimulation in certain cortical places rather than others?

Also,

As Bill says, the locution ‘sense-greenly’ just makes no sense, unless it is replaceable salva significatione with ‘sense something green’.

But consider the rhomboidal region B in the above image. It's the same colour as the dark grey region A. When our attention is drawn to B do we sense something dark gray? Or do we sense it as light grey? Arguably both. The adverbial form resolves the ambiguity in favour of the phenomenal colour, light grey. Once true colour and phenomenal colour part company the way is open to interpret true colour as phenomenal colour under some set of standard conditions.

[BV]

>>It is perfectly possible for a surface to reflect light of both red and green wavelengths. But it is impossible (as Wittgenstein and more recently Johnston noted), for the surface of an object to be both phenomenally green and red at the same time. (I'm afraid I had to use the word phenomenally there, apologies).<<

Your bias is showing, Oz. The topic of this thread is qualia. Qualia, by definition, are phenomenal items. So you are apologizing for addressing the topic of the thread! Lycan, in his SEP entry, gave the example of a green after-image. It cannot be either outside or inside anyone's head. The after-image is a quintessentially phenomenal item. What will you do now, go eliminativist on us and deny the phenomenological evidence? Surely you have experienced after-images. And surely you know that photons don't bounce off of them.

[oz the ostrich]

>The topic of this thread is qualia

Ahem, the title of this thread, which is yours, has the word “qualia”. I try to avoid the word, except in scare quotes.

To Brightly:

> Ed says, “cortical stimulation [...] does correspond closely to the responses of subjects asked to say whether they experience greenness or not [...] Against the third, there is no existent corresponding to phenomenal greenness, at least for materialists.”
Aren't these statements in contradiction? <

I don’t see the contradiction. The first statement is consistent with a behaviourist approach where we ask subjects to report on what they see, or appear to see. In the second, I should have put scare quotes around ‘phenomenal greenness’.

> Once true colour and phenomenal colour part company

I think once we introduce the idea of Gestalt or shape and colour constancy, we have agreed to some kind of indirect realism aka representationalism.

[oz]

Can we resolve the apparent awkwardness of the adverbial account using a that-clause account? I was just shaving in the mirror and I could describe everything that appears behind the mirror by a large that-clause. “…that there is a man standing behind the mirror, about pensionable age but very good looking, only a few grey hairs, wearing a blue jumper over a white t-shirt etc etc”. If we put “it is true” then our description implies the existence of such a man behind the mirror, hence different from myself. But if we put “It appears” then there is no such existential implication.

I don’t think this solves the deeper problem though, namely that there really is something, namely an image, behind the mirror. It must be an immaterial something, because there is solid brick and mortar behind the mirror.

Also, as you point out, if the something-behind-mirror is neither in the brain nor in the physical world outside, then physicalism collapses and we have to admit, er, "phenomena".

[BV]

>>the title of this thread, which is yours, has the word “qualia”. I try to avoid the word, except in scare quotes.<<

You have forgotten that you sent me an e-mail message the title of which was 'Qualia' I then reproduced what you sent me under the title 'The Analysis of Qualia.' So you are off-topic.

The topic of this thread, which is given by the totle supra, is qualia. Qualia, by definition, are phenomenal items. So you are apologizing for addressing the topic of the thread! Lycan, in his SEP entry, gave the example of a green after-image. It cannot be either outside or inside anyone's head. The after-image is a quintessentially phenomenal item. What will you do now, go eliminativist on us and deny the phenomenological evidence? Surely you have experienced after-images. And surely you know that photons don't bounce off of them.

Now if you deny the existence of qualia, then you are not worth talking to, leastways, not on this topic.

Thanks anyway for sending me to the Lycan argumwnt which is a good argument against materialism about the mind.

[oz the ostrich]

OK my apologies.

[oz]

>Now if you deny the existence of qualia, then you are not worth talking to, leastways, not on this topic.

Are you sure? Here are the three assumptions that generate the conclusion:

1) Bertie is experiencing a green thing.
2) Suppose that there is no physical green thing outside Bertie’s head. But
3) There is no physical green thing inside Bertie’s head either.

One could reasonably accept 2 and 3, but deny 1.

[BV]

1) Bertie is experiencing a green thing.
2) Suppose that there is no physical green thing outside Bertie’s head. But
3) There is no physical green thing inside Bertie’s head either.

Here's a cleaner triad:

1*) Bertie is experiencing a green after-image.
2*) There is nothing green outside Bertie's head.
3*) There is nothing green inside Bertie's head.

How could one reasonably deny (1*) given that you have already admitted that adverbial theories of sensation are unreasonable if not absurd?

[David Brightly]

Ed,

1. cortical stimulation [...] does correspond closely to the responses of subjects asked to say whether they experience greenness or not [...]
2. Against the third, there is no existent corresponding to phenomenal greenness, at least for materialists.

The existent denied in (2) is the cortical stimulation claimed in (1). Contradiction.

[oz the ostrich]

I'm playing devil's advocate.

I can see this developing into a debate about "thin" versus "thick" accounts of existence. In Reference and Identity p.123 and passim I argue that some verbs are intentional and take accusatives that do not denote anything. On this account it is perfectly reasonable to deny (1) as interpreted as wide scope, but accept a narrow scope reading. I.e. deny “some green thing is such that Bertie is experiencing it”, but affirm “Bertie is experiencing a green thing”. Just as we can accept “Bertie wants a wife” but deny “some wife is such that Bertie wants her”.

[oz the ostrich]

Brightly:
>The existent denied in (2) is the cortical stimulation claimed in (1). Contradiction. <

No, the existent denied in (2) is not cortical stimulation, but rather "phenomenal greenness". Or are you saying that when people use terms like "phenomenal greenness" or "greenness-as-we-experience-it" etc, they are in fact referring to cortical stimulation?

[oz]

Let's try again. Suppose

1*) Bertie is experiencing a green after-image.
2*) There is nothing green outside Bertie's head.
3*) There is nothing green inside Bertie's head.

Bill asks “How could one reasonably deny (1*) given that you [sic, = ‘one’] have already admitted that adverbial theories of sensation are unreasonable if not absurd?”

Easily. By assumption, 2*) and *3) are true. Then consider

1**) Bertie is imagining a green unicorn

This does not imply that anything is green, because there are no such things as unicorns, hence no such thing as green unicorns. The verb ‘imagining’ is intentional, i.e. does not imply that something is signified by its accusative. Then we could allow that “Bertie is experiencing a green after-image” is true, so long as ‘experiencing’ is read as an intentional verb. ‘Green after-image’ is analogous to ‘green unicorn’. This analysis does not involve an adverbial theory, as I understand adverbial theories. We are not modifying ‘experience’ with an adverb. Rather, we are interpreting the verb in a different, i.e. intentional, way.

Alternatively we could reasonably deny “Bertie is experiencing a green after-image” if ‘experiencing’ is to be read as a non-intentional verb. For that implies that there is something green that is neither inside nor outside Bertie’s head, which by assumption is untrue. In which case we have reasonably denied (1*) while continuing to maintain that adverbial theories are absurd.

[BV]

>> “Bertie is experiencing a green after-image” is true, so long as ‘experiencing’ is read as an intentional verb. ‘Green after-image’ is analogous to ‘green unicorn’.<<

I deny the analogy. The green after-image is a datum immediately evident to Bertie's visual awareness. He cannot deny it and its being green. It is irrelevant to point out if he is thinking about a green unicorn, it does not follow that there exists an x such x is a unicorn and x is green.

More later.

[oz the logical ostrich]

>It is irrelevant to point out if he is thinking about a green unicorn, it does not follow that there exists an x such x is a unicorn and x is green.

It’s not irrelevant at all. Compare

(1) If X is imagining a green unicorn, then some unicorn is green
(2) If X is imagining a green after image, then some after image is green

These have the same logical form. Why is (2) a good consequence, but (1) not, according to you?

>The green after-image is a datum immediately evident to Bertie's visual awareness

By the same reasoning, why can't I say that a green unicorn is a datum immediately evident to my imagination?

[David Brightly]

Nobody as yet has pointed out the ambiguity in Lycan's (1). It could mean

1a. There is a green thing causing sensation in Bertie. Or
1b. Bertie is experiencing as of something green.

In (1a) Bertie's sensation may not be as of something green and in (1b) there may not be anything green causing Bertie's sensation. This is a fact of life regarding our perceptual system. Now interpretation (1a) is immediately inconsistent with (2) and (3) so we must assume Lycan means interpretation (1b). But then (4) is not well-founded. We cannot move from (1b) to 'There is a green thing'.

Also, interpretation (1b) squeezes the second object ('a green thing') out of (1). Its 'as of something green' has to be understood adverbially.

[BV]

David,

If I say 'I am having an experience as of a green tree' I speak noncommittally and leave open the possibility that there is no green tree in the external world that is the object of my visual experience. Suppose there is no green tree out there. The content of the experience remains the same: a green datum appears to me. If no green datum appeared to me, then 'I am having an experience as of a green tree' would be meaningless. You haven't gotten rid of the green datum. It would also be meaningless to go adverbial and say, 'I am experiencing greenly-ly ' or 'I am being appeared to green-ly.'

[David Brightly]

Bill,

If no green datum appeared to me, then 'I am having an experience as of a green tree' would be meaningless.

Why meaniningless? Merely false, surely, just as 'I am running quickly' would be false if I were running slowly?