J. P. Moreland on Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism

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Apart from what Alvin Plantinga has called creative anti-realism, the two main philosophical options for many of us in the West are some version of naturalism and some version of Judeo-Christian theism. As its title indicates, J. P. Moreland’s The Recalcitrant Imago Dei: Human Persons and the Failure of Naturalism (SCM Press, 2009) supports the theistic position by way of a penetrating critique of naturalism and such associated doctrines as scientism. Moreland briefly discusses creative anti-realism in the guise of postmodernism on pp. 13-14, but I won’t report on that except to say that his arguments against it, albeit brief, are to my mind decisive. Section One of this review will present in some detail Moreland’s conception of naturalism and what it entails. Sections Two and Three will discuss his argument from consciousness for the existence of God. Section Four will ever so briefly report on the contents of the rest of the book.

Comments

[Elliott]

Bill,

Thanks for the good review of Moreland’s book. Here are a couple of points I recall appreciating when I read the book years ago. I just turned to the relevant pages to confirm my memory:

First, in Chapter 2, Moreland evaluates alternatives to the AC. In particular, he notes that Searle’s biological naturalism, which challenges premise (5)*, “misconstrues the problem” of consciousness and thus “fails to address the real issue.” (p. 36)** Regarding McGinn’s mysterianism or “agnostic naturalism,” it “does not solve the problem of consciousness" but merely relocates it. (p. 38) And panpsychism, Moreland suspects, is merely a label and not an explanation of how and why the mental coheres with the physical. (pp. 39-40) He closes Chapter 2 by noting that if the denial of consciousness is the price to pay for being a naturalist, then the price is too high. (p. 40)

Second, in Chapter 3, Moreland notes that libertarianism is the common-sense, intuitive view of human free will. As Moreland puts it, “unless one has an ideological axe to grind, one will be a libertarian.” (p. 41) If one's naturalism or determinism requires one to adopt an alternative view of free will, one will continue to live as a libertarian when one is not "reminding oneself of one's ideological commitments. (p. 41)

*(5): The explanation is not a natural scientific one.

**Searle argues that consciousness is an emergent biological process like digestion. For Searle, apparently, digestion is to digestive system as consciousness is to brain.

[BV]

Thanks for your comments, Elliot.

Let me make just one comment about Searle. He is a brilliant critic of other people's theories. But when it comes time to present his own theory he gives one as bad as the theories he criticizes. Maybe worse.