Once More on Whether Existence Could be a Property

This just over the transom from Samuli Isotalo:

 

I recently started reading your book A Paradigm Theory of Existence and the following kind of argument against the view that existence is a first-level property came to my mind. Probably you and many others have considered something like this, but I send it anyway.

 

Suppose existence is a first-level property and to exist is to instantiate this property. Now, given that some substance a instantiates some property P, we most likely want to say that this property P itself also exists. Thus, given that some substance exists, we want to say that the property, existence, it instantiates, also exists. But if to exist is to instantiate a property, existence, then it seems that in order for this property to exist, it needs to instantiate a further property, existence₂. But then we also want to say that this property, existence₂, exists, therefore it needs its own property, existence₃, and so on ad infinitum.

 

You make three points.

 

The first is that, if existence is a first-level property, a property of concrete individuals or substances, and if the existing of substance a is its instantiating of this property, then the first-level property of existence must itself exist. I agree.  For if existence did not itself exist, then neither a nor any concrete individual would exist.  This holds no matter to which category we assign existence.  No matter what existence itself is, were it not to exist, nothing would exist. But if you read me carefully, you will see that I resolutely deny that existence is a property (where properties are defined in terms of instantiation) of anything, whether individuals, properties, concepts, linguistic  expressions, worlds, . . . whatever.

 

Your second point is that if existence is a property of individuals, and existence itself exists, then there has to be a second property, existence_2, in virtue of whose instantiation existence₁ exists.  But this doesn't follow. For it may be that existence is a self-instantiating property, roughly in the way a Platonic Form is self-exemplifying.  (But we needn't digress into a discussion of Plato, his Forms (eide), participation (methexis) in Forms, the Third Man Regress, etc.)

 

Consider the property of being concrete. Is it itself concrete? No, it is abstract. Now consider the property of being abstract. Is it itself abstract? Yes. Therefore, the property of being abstract is self-instantiating. (Notice: I did not say self-exemplifying. A property is not an exemplar.). The same holds for other putative properties: self-identity is self-identical, causal inertness is causally inert, omnitemporality is omnitemporal. 

 

So why can't existence be self-instantiating? I am not saying that it is, but if it is, then, to your third point,  the infinite regress cannot get started. Note also that if properties are necessary beings, as many philosophers maintain, and if existence is a property of individuals, then too the infinite regress could not arise.

 

Thus, treating existence as a first level property leads to an infinite regress. Existence seems to always pass on to some further property, like a slippery piece of soap that one cannot catch. What if we say that the property existence itself just exists, without it instantiating any further property? Then it seems that we have arrived at a picture very much like the one you are endorsing, namely, existence itself as Paradigm. For then we have this one property existence, which alone exists without it pointing to anything further, and every other thing exists in relation to it, by participating in it or instantiating it. But then it seems that to call such a thing ‘property’ is misleading, for properties are ontologically posterior to substances. Now, this reminds a lot of Aquinas, when he says, e.g. in De Ente et Essentia that existence itself is to be understood as something absolute and every other thing as participating in it.

What you are missing is that I deny that existence is a property. So your criticisms do not touch my view. What I conclude, after  a complicated argument that I cannot here summarize, is that existence is more like a paradigmatic individual. It is not a predicable entity. It is more like the opposite of a predicable entity. It is not a property of individuals, properties, or anything else. As I said above, self-existent Existence, as that in virtue of which everything else exists, resembles a Platonic paradigm. You are right to catch the similarity to Aquinas, although my argumentation is wholly non-Thomistic. It is unlike any of his Five Ways. This because it it not based on an Aristotelian substance ontology, but on a fact ontology deriving from Gustav Bergmann and D. M. Armstrong.

Comments

[Richard Norris]

Mr Vallicella,
This formulation you have is approaching henology.

[Samuli Isotalo]

Let me emphasize that I wasn’t arguing against you, but against the view that existence is a property. I am very sympathetic to your view, at least in its general form insofar as I understand it, namely, that Existence itself is a Being in virtue of which everything else, every contingent being, exists.

Now, the first part of my argument tries to show that assuming existence is a property and also assuming that to exist is to instantiate such a property, and here we should add that such a property is not self-instantiating, then an infinite regress is generated. This seems problematic to the view that existence is a property.

But what if it is self-instantiating? Or, as I write in my vulgar way: “What if we say that the property existence itself just exists, without it instantiating any further property.” What would it mean to have an entity like that? Furthermore, if we hold – and I certainly do hold, and if I understand you correctly, you also hold – that existence must be primary; that there is nothing ‘before’ existence, no real beings in some metaphysical non-existent no-man’s land waiting to become existent, then it seems that we have in fact arrived at a picture very much like that of yours. For we have a being whose existence is absolute, a being who exists in virtue of itself, and every other being exists in relation to it. To call it now a ‘property’ is misleading, as I said, because property seems to imply something posterior and here we have a being which is absolutely prior to anything.

So, I tried to show that to assume that existence is a property either leads into an infinite regress or it leads into a position where it must be admitted that existence itself is something absolute, namely, a being which exists in virtue of itself and therefore it is not a property.

Maybe this is vague and maybe I am missing something, but it seems to me that to start with the assumption that existence is a self-instantiating property – together with the view that existence is primary, that there is nothing non-existent – in fact forces one NOT to consider it as a property. For if existence itself is primary, then this ‘self-instantiating property’ is the one and only primary and absolute being that gives existence to everything else.

-Samuli

[BV]

Mr Norris,

You are right: it approaches henology. It moves in that direction. My favorite line from the Enneads is: "It is by the One that all beings are beings." The Paradigm Existent = Existence itself = Being (das Sein selbst) in its difference from beings (das Seiende) has to be ONE: it cannot be a being among beings. So the Paradigm Existent is in the conceptual vicinity of the Plotinian One, except that it is not beyond Being but (identically) Being itself.

Deus est ipsum esse subsistens (Aquinas). God or the Absolute is the paradigm case of Being. It is Being (esse, Sein) but also being (ens, seiend). God is not a being, but the being: the one being that is (identically) Being.

That's the drift of my thinking. I grant you that the drift is 'henological' -- but it doesn't go all the way.

Here is a portion of a relevant article: https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004320758/B9789004320758-s007.xml

[BV]

Samuli,

It looks as if we agree on an important point: existence cannot be a property of individuals, or properties, of concepts, of anything. Nothing exists by instantiating the supposed property of existence. Of course, I am assuming a definition of 'property':

P is a property =df P is possibly instantiated. All and only properties are instantiable items.

So my cat Max, who exists, does not exist by instantiating existence. And yet 'Max exists' predicates existence of Max, and is a true predication, which is to say: existence belongs to Max, but without being a property of him. One of the problems I try to solve in my book is: how can existence belong to a concrete individual without being a property of it?

>>Furthermore, if we hold – and I certainly do hold, and if I understand you correctly, you also hold – that existence must be primary; that there is nothing ‘before’ existence, no real beings in some metaphysical non-existent no-man’s land waiting to become existent, then it seems that we have in fact arrived at a picture very much like that of yours.<<

We appear to be in agreement here as well. There are no Avicennian-Meinongian non-existent items waiting to acquire existence. So before Socrates came to exist, there was no individual essence with his name on it, so to speak, that came to exist. There was no merely possible Socrates that came to be actual by the superaddition of existence to a merely possible individual essence that was already 'there' in some sense or other. To put it another way, before Socrates began to exist, there was no DE RE possibility that THAT VERY INDIVIDUAL come to exist. Before Socrates began to exist, there was no Socratic thisness/haecceity that came to exist, which implies that Socrates achieved his incommunicable haecceity only at the moment when he began to exist.

>>Maybe this is vague and maybe I am missing something, but it seems to me that to start with the assumption that existence is a self-instantiating property – together with the view that existence is primary, that there is nothing non-existent – in fact forces one NOT to consider it as a property. For if existence itself is primary, then this ‘self-instantiating property’ is the one and only primary and absolute being that gives existence to everything else.<<

It may be that I misunderstood what you were maintaining. If existence is not a property, then of course it cannot be a self-instantiating property. And if, pace Meinong & Co, there are no nonexistent items, then existence cannot be a property that some individuals have (instantiate) and some individuals lack (do not instantiate).

But now, let me put a question to you: why shouldn't we just say that Existence just is the totality of things that exist, that the word 'existence' just refers to existing items and not to something in virtue of which they exist? Why not just say that? Why not just say that the existence/existing of my cat Max is (identically) Max! That there is no difference between Max and Max's existence? I ask in my book about existence in its difference from existing items. But what reason is there to think that that is a legitimate question??

[Richard Norris]

Mr. Vallicella,
Understood. For me, however, if the One is, then the One is an Individual and also the principle of individuation at the same time, that tautological principle that states that each thing that exists is a thing that exists. It's curious and confounding that we might both be called "neo" Platonists here, while disagreeing as to the nature of the First Principle.

[Dominik Kowalski]

Bill,

Sadly I'm on vacation right now and I don't have a copy of the book by my side. If I remember correctly though, the answer you yourself gave was that saying that the existence of Max being identical to Max would make him loose his status as a contingent existent, since his nature and his being would become identical.
While you didn't use the PSR in your book, we can use it to answer your question. It's a perfectly reasonable thing to ask why there are any contingent existents. Contingency here doesn't even have to mean genuinely possible non-existence, but just the lack of aseity. The Nous is always emanated, but it doesn't exist through itself. And just referencing the Nous itself would be a non-answer. It's just stating that it actually exists, but it doesn't have the resource to explain how that can be the case. This is also why I maintain that 1) the thin theory of existence is contradicted by the PSR and 2) that thin theorists like van Inwagen and Merricks don't have the resources to call God or any other item "necessary".
So things exist, and they exist differently. Some are dependent upon others, and that which explains contingency, exists through itself. A "totality" can't be properly formulated, since neither as a sum nor as its own substance would it exist in a different way through which it would be capable of explaining existence.
The assumption that the concrete totality is necessary, paired with the PSR, leads to the impossibility of change. Since everything in the necessary being is essential, nothing could change, since the changing property by definition would have to be contingently linked to the essence of the object. But we are already at the explanatory locus, there is no room for this kind of contingency. Of course, change can't be denied, but every kind of change either requires contingent properties, which violates the PSR, or substantial change, which would mean that the "necessary being" went out of existence. With change, either the properties or the existence must be contingent.
The problem with calling one particular item necessary is similar, but I will keep it brief. For one, there is no case of causation of immanent objects that doesn't involve a transfer of properties. Secondly, it seems that when we identify the essence of a particular, limited item with its existence, nothing else could ever exist.

Addendum: Here is an article on how Aquinas's angelology draws upon Proclus' henadology. It got published three weeks ago by Seamus O'Neill

https://ojs.library.dal.ca/dionysius/article/view/12198

[Samuli Isotalo]

“But now, let me put a question to you: why shouldn't we just say that Existence just is the totality of things that exist, that the word 'existence' just refers to existing items and not to something in virtue of which they exist? Why not just say that? Why not just say that the existence/existing of my cat Max is (identically) Max! That there is no difference between Max and Max's existence? I ask in my book about existence in its difference from existing items. But what reason is there to think that that is a legitimate question??”

It seems to me that we should not say that the existence of Max is identical with Max.

For Max exists as a cat and not as something else, for example like me who exist as a human. That is to say, Max’s nature in a way determines his existence – he exists like this and not like that – which then differentiates it from some other form of existence, such as the existence of me. Yet Max and I both have existence in common.

Suppose now that Max is his existence, that is, Max’s nature is identical with his existence. It seems to follow that Max’s existence is then pure existence, existence as such. For if Max’s nature would receive existence, thereby determining him to exist as a cat, then Max’s nature and his existence would not be identical. If A receives B, then A is not identical with B. So, if Max’s nature is identical with his existence, then no receiving of existence nor any kind of determination due to Max’s nature.

But surely this is false. For Max indeed exists as a cat; his nature determines him to exist in a certain way, and so he is not existence as such, but rather existence of this kind. Hence, Max’s nature is not identical with his existence.

Furthermore, if Max would be his existence, then it seems that he would exist in virtue of himself. For then his existence is not given to him by something external to him, and therefore he would be a necessary being.

But surely this is false also. The reason for Max’s existence points to something beyond him. He does not exist in virtue of himself.

-Samuli

[BV]

Samuli,

Very good. You touch upon the two main points. First, >>Yet Max and I both have existence in common.<< Generalizing, there are many existents but they all have existence in common. Therefore existence, as common to each existent cannot be identical to any one of them. Second, if the existence of Max = Max, then Max is a necessary being.