Étienne Gilson on the Jewish Philosophers He Knew

Étienne Gilson (1884-1978) writing in 1962 about his experiences as a student at the Sorbonne circa 1900:

. . . instead of resorting to philosophy for a better understanding of their religious faith, as Christian philosophers do, the Jews I have known have used philosophy to liberate themselves from their religion. Christians philosophize to  identify themselves more intimately with their Christianity; our masters philosophized in order to run away from the synagogue. The illustrious example of Spinoza is a typical instance of what I mean. After the Theologico-Political Treatise, written as a farewell to the Law, its commands and it rites, came the Ethica, whose purpose was to create a mental universe in which reason was liberated from all contact with any religious revelation, Jewish or Christian. It would seem that the philosophical conversion of such children of Israel consists in turning their backs on their religion. (The Philosopher and Theology, Cluny Media, 2020, p. 6)

Gilson is of course speaking of his experiences with his teachers at the Sorbonne circa 1900. What he says, however, suggests a follow-up question I am not competent to answer.

Consider Jews of all times and places who (i) became professional philosophers and who (ii) were brought up in Judaism and who (iii) have used philosophy to liberate themselves from their religion.  Is their number greater than the number of cradle Christians who became professional philosophers and then used philosophy to liberate themselves from their religion?  My guess is the answer is in the affirmative.  If so, why?

We can ask a parallel question about Muslims. 

Comments

[james soriano]

I’m not competent to address your questions either, but I have thought about the relationships among the three monos in a different light. Instead of measuring them against philosophy, use “secularism.”

It would give a proposition like this: “Secularism is the bane of Judaism and Christianity, but the salvation of Islam.”

Two implications here:

-- A fascination with the secular order is a challenge to the authenticity of the three monos. In large amounts, secularism in Judaism and Christianity is something bad because it causes them to loose their authenticity; whereas even in small amounts, it is something good in Islam because it lessens the severity of its authenticity.

-- A Judeo-Christian outlook defines what is good and what is bad.

[BV]

An interesting proposition, James, but I don't know what to say about it. You need to develop it.

It is true that both Judaism and Christianity, when secularized, lose their character, especially Christianity. Christ says, "My kingdom is not of this world" in response to Pilate. I'd say that of the three 'monos' Xianity is the most otherworldly, and this despite the crucial role of the Incarnation, which valorizes this world over against Platonic and other forms of world-denial.

Judaism is in second place as less world-denying than Xianity. Cf. Pascal's railing against Jewish materialism.

Islam is in third place as the least world-denying of the three great monotheisms, so much so that it is as much a political ideology as a religion.

In Islam, the transcendence of God is most highly accentuated. I take you to be saying that this extremism is mitigated by the political character of Islam. This is how I would attach sense to your claim that secularism is the salvation of Islam.

But this is a very murky topic, especially without a definition of secularism on the table.

[BV]

Secundum Ioannem 18:36 Respondit Iesus: Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo. My kingdom is not of this world.

I was expecting to find saeculum, not mundus. Saeculum could mean age.

[Elliott]

This is an interesting post.

I don’t know the answer to Bill’s question. But on a related note: a distinction occurred to me, which is one I've considered before, though not in this context. There’s an important difference between (a) using philosophical methods to liberate from or identify better with one’s doxastic commitments (religious or otherwise) in areas for which we lack objective certainty, and (b) using philosophical methods to seek the truth in such areas, being willing to follow good arguments wherever they lead.

Another set of questions: is (b) better than (a), or vice versa? Are they of equal value? Do they not stand in axiological relations of better than/worse than or equal to?

[BV]

Elliot,

It is not clear to me how (a) can include both liberation from and identification with the rites, rituals, and doctrines of the RCC, say. Liberation requires giving philosophy the last word, whereas identification as in the case of Gilson requires giving the doxastic commitment the last word and reducing philosophy to ancillary status.

As for (b), how is it different from the liberation mentioned in (a)?

[Elliott]

Bill,

Thanks for your questions. I should have been more precise.

Here’s how I’m seeing the difference between (a) and (b). It’s a matter of motive.

For category (a), the driving motive is to settle one’s adult/mature position regarding the doxastic system (e.g., Roman Catholicism, Judaism) in which one was raised. This motive is independent from whether or not the system is true. There are (at least) two options in (a). First, one can use philosophical methods to accept the system. Call this (a1). Second, one can use philosophical methods to reject the system (a2). The acceptance or rejection is not motivated by a desire to obtain the truth about the system. The acceptance might be driven by a desire for community or stability of belief. For example, the person might want to continue believing what he has believed since childhood, regardless of the truth value of the belief. The rejection might be motivated by a desire for independence from one’s childhood commitments, a desire for novelty, a desire to fit in with one’s colleagues, etc.

For (b), the preponderant motive is to find the truth, regardless of whether or not it confirms the system. Those in (b) think long and hard about the system, testing it with the critical methods of philosophy.

The difference between (b) and (a2) is that the primary aim in (b) is truth, and philosophy has the last word (or at least is not reduced to ancillary status). The goal in (a2) is not truth, but some other end, such as desire to fit in with peers, find psychological stability or peace of mind, etc. Philosophy is auxiliary to that other end.

Suppose Jones and Smith were reared in Judaism. Both leave the religion as adults. Jones exits because of secular pressure to be non-religious and uses a few basic philosophical arguments to support his exit. Jones is an example of (a2). Smith leaves because he has subjected the religion to years of rigorous philosophical scrutiny and concludes that it is likely false. Smith is an example of (b).

[Elliott]

Category (b) can also be divided into (b1) and (b2). In the former, one thoroughly scrutinizes the doxastic system and finds it rationally acceptable. In the latter, one’s scrutiny indicates that the system is not rationally acceptable.

[Elliott]

And there's a b3: one's scrutiny leaves one at an impasse.

On this point, the Academic Skeptics had a helpful idea: at the theoretical level, refrain from making a conclusive judgment and keep inquiring; at the practical level, accept and act on the 'to eulogon' (the reasonable, probable) or 'to pithanon' (the plausible). Cicero translated 'pithanon' as 'probabile' (probable, likely).

[BV]

Elliot @ 9:05: >>For category (a), the driving motive is to settle one’s adult/mature position regarding the doxastic system (e.g., Roman Catholicism, Judaism) in which one was raised. This motive is independent from whether or not the system is true.<<

What is to "settle" one's adult position? For me that could mean only one thing: try to determine whether what one has been brought up to believe is either true or reasonably believed to be true.

[Elliott]

>> >>For category (a), the driving motive is to settle one’s adult/mature position regarding the doxastic system (e.g., Roman Catholicism, Judaism) in which one was raised. This motive is independent from whether or not the system is true.<<

What is to "settle" one's adult position? For me that could mean only one thing: try to determine whether what one has been brought up to believe is either true or reasonably believed to be true. <<

Good question, Bill. As I’m thinking about the term, ‘settle’ can be distinguished according to normative and descriptive kinds. Normatively, to settle a position is, as you’ve described, a matter of determining whether it is true or reasonably believed. This is how one ought to settle one’s beliefs.

Descriptively, however, people often don’t settle as they ought to. Many don’t value truth and reason much, but instead seek security, acceptance, independence, etc. They settle their beliefs based on the desire to fit in, appear sophisticated, maintain a party affiliation, secure money or other resources, chart their own course of life, deconstruct traditional views, find peace of mind, find and keep a romantic partner, etc.