Is everything in time? Or are there timeless entities?
So-called abstracta are held by many to be timeless. Among abstracta we find numbers, (abstract as opposed to concrete) states of affairs, mathematical (as opposed to commonsense) sets, and Fregean (as opposed to Russellian) propositions, where a Fregean proposition (Gedanke) is the sense (Sinn) of a sentence (Satz) in the indicative mood from which all indexical elements, including the tenses of verbs, have been removed. The following items are neither in space, nor causally active/passive, but some say that they exist in time at every time: 7, 7's being prime, {7}, that 7 is prime. If an item exists in time at every time, then it is omnitemporal. If an item is 'outside' time, then it is timeless or eternal or, to be helpfully pleonastic in the manner of the late Hugh McCann, timelessly eternal.
Let us agree that a temporalist is one for whom everything is in time, while an eternalist is one for whom some things are not in time. This is a correct use of 'eternalist' as opposed to the misuse of those who use 'eternalism' to oppose presentism by maintaining that temporal items such as Socrates and his drinking of the hemlock exist tenselessly. Temporal items that exist tenselessly are precisely temporal items and not eternal items. It is perhaps for this reason that McCann's pleonasm is justified. The tenselessly 'eternal' is in time and therefore not timelessly eternal.
On p. 55 of his Creation and the Sovereignty of God (Indiana University Press 2012), Hugh McCann argues that the temporalist, who maintains that everything is in time, cannot formulate his thesis without presupposing that there are timeless states of affairs, at least of the negative sort. Here is how I see the argument.
Part of what the temporalist says is that
1. There are no timeless states of affairs.
How is 'there are no' in (1) to be understood? The temporalist must intend it to be taken in a way consistent with temporalism, thus:
2. There never have been, are not now, and never will be any timeless states of affairs.
Unfortunately, the eternalist, who maintains that some things are not in time, will agree with the temporalist on the truth of (2). Consider 7's being prime. Both agree that at no time does this state of affairs exist. It does not exist at any time because it exists outside of time. The agreement is unfortunate because it shows that the bone of contention cannot be formulated in terms of (2). The bone of contention must be formulated in terms of (1) taken tenselessly. Thus
1.* It is tenselessly true that there are no timeless states of affairs.
But (1.*) entails
3. It is timelessly true that there are no timeless states of affairs.
But (3) is self-refuting. Temporalism, when properly formulated, i.e., when formulated in a way that permits disagreement between temporalist and eternalist, refutes itself by implying its own negation.
So not everything can be in time. Abstracta are timeless, not tenseless.
A Parallel with the Problem of Formulating Presentism
We have seen in previous posts that to avoid tautology the presentist, according to whom the temporally present alone exists, must reach for a tenseless sense of 'exists.' He cannot say, tautologically, that whatever exists (present tense) exists now. For that is not metaphysical 'news.' It is nothing to fight over, and fight we must. He has to say: Whatever tenselessly exists, exists now. But then he seems to presuppose that there are times, as real as the present time, at which temporal individuals such as Socrates tenselessly exist. The upshot is that when presentism is given a non-tautological formulation, a formulation that permits disagreement beween presentist and anti-presentist, it refutes itself. For if there are non-present times as real as the present time, then it is not the case that only present items exist.
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