On deism, God starts the universe existing, but then he takes it easy, allowing it to exist on its own in virtue of its 'existential inertia.' The latter is an analog of inertia in physics. Newton's First Law states that a body at rest or in uniform rectilinear motion continues in its state of rest or motion unless acted upon by an external force. Analogously, what could be called the First Law of Deistic Metaphysics states that an existing thing continues to exist on its own without external assistance unless acted upon by an external annihilatory force. This is but a rough and preliminary formulation of the thesis of existential inertia. Continuing to exist is the 'default.' Suppose I bring a primitive table into existence by placing a board on a stump. The thought behind 'existential inertia' is that the compound object that just came to be does not need something to keep it from blinking out of existence a nanosecond, microsecond, millisecond . . . later.
On classical theism, by contrast with deism, God is no mere cosmic starter-upper: creatures need God not only to begin to exist but to continue existing moment by moment. A defense of classical theism against deism must therefore include a rejection of existential inertia.
Steven Nemes offers a rejection of existential inertia in his article Deism, Classical Theism, and Existential Inertia. He solicits my comments. I am happy to oblige.
He defines the phrase as follows:
Let’s say that the existence of a thing is “inertial” if and only if it continues to exist over time, in the absence of annihilating factors, without the assistance of anything outside of it.
He gives the example of a cat which, "once in existence, continues to exist over time, so long as nothing intervenes to destroy it, without anything outside of the cat helping it or sustaining it in existence." But surely the cat cannot continue to exist without air, water, food, a tolerable range of temperatures, and so on, factors clearly external to the cat. Note also that Nemes' definition presupposes that only temporal items are existentially inertial which is not obvious: on a classically theistic scheme even so-called 'abstract objects' are going to have to be existentially inertial. But I won't worry this second point in this entry.
Here is a better way to convey the notion of existential inertia. Suppose a deistic god creates exactly one iron sphere and nothing else. In this world there is nothing to cause the sphere to rust or otherwise corrode away into nonexistence. Nor does it, like a living organism, require anything external to it to continue to exist. It doesn't need oxygen or water like Nemes' cat. And it has no internal mechanism to self-destruct. The sphere exists inertially iff its 'default setting' is continued existence which is to say: it has no intrinsic tendency to cease to exist.
The sphere is of course a contingent being. Hence there is no necessity that it continue to exist. But while there is no necessity that it continue to exist, it will continue to exist absent some external annihilatory force. The deistic god could zap it out of existence, but if he doesn't, it will continue to exist on its own 'steam.' He needn't do anything to keep it in existence, and of course he can't if he is truly deistic.
And the same goes for the cat, despite the cat's need for materials in its environment such as oxygen and food. It too will continue to exist if those things are supplied without the need for a special metaphysical factor to keep it from sliding into nonbeing. The critter's natural default is to existence.
Nemes's Argument against Existential Inertia
1) The real existence of the cat does not show itself as one of its properties.
2) "The real existence of the cat is thus not a part of that total complex of individuated properties which make up the particular cat which we experience. "
3) "The unexperienceable real existence of the experienceable cat must therefore be something that is somehow “outside” of the cat, and yet “pointed at it” in such a way that the cat exists."
4) "This is easy to understand if we say that the existence of the cat consists in its standing on the receiving end of an existence-endowing relation to “something else.” ". . . a “something else” that is not itself an individual thing with properties but rather pure existence itself. And this “pure existence itself,” according to classical theists, is God."
(1) is true. (2) appears merely to unpack (explicate) (1); if so, it too is true. The transition to (3), however, is a non sequitur. The real existence of the cat might be hidden within it or an empirically inaccessible feature of it. Absent further premises, one cannot conclude that the real existence is 'outside' the cat.
Of course, I am not endorsing existential inertia; I am merely pointing out that the above argument, as it stands, is invalid. Perhaps with further work it can be made valid.
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