Euthyphro Again: The 'Bite the Bullet' Response

From the IEP entry on Divine Command Theory:

a. Bite the Bullet

One possible response to the Euthyphro Dilemma is to simply accept that if God does command cruelty, then inflicting it upon others would be morally obligatory. In Super 4 Libros Sententiarum, William of Ockham states that the actions which we call “theft” and “adultery” would be obligatory for us if God commanded us to do them. Most people find this to be an unacceptable view of moral obligation, on the grounds that any theory of ethics that leaves open the possibility that such actions are morally praiseworthy is fatally flawed. However, as Robert Adams (1987) points out, a full understanding of Ockham’s view here would emphasize that it is a mere logical possibility that God could command adultery or cruelty, and not a real possibility. That is, even if it is logically possible that God could command cruelty, it is not something that God will do, given his character in the actual world. Given this, Ockham himself was surely not prepared to inflict suffering on others if God commanded it. Even with this proviso, however, many reject this type of response to the Euthyphro Dilemma.

I don't buy Adams' defense of Ockham. Let me explain.

What makes a morally obligatory action morally obligatory? On a divine command theory, it is God's commanding the action that makes it morally obligatory: the obligatory action is obligatory because God commands it. Saying this has the advantage of upholding the divine sovereignty which, apparently, would not be upheld if one were to say that God commands the obligatory because it is obligatory.  For on the latter alternative, it appears that God would be subject to a moral standard external to him. 

But then the arbitrarity objection kicks in: were God to command that we hate one another, say, then it would be obligatory that we do so. To bite the bullet is to say, yes, that is right: were God to command hate, theft, or adultery, then these actions would be obligatory. Thus Ockham according to Adams (according  to IEP).

But, Adams replies, these counterintuitive divine commands, while logically possible, are not really possible. It is not really possible for God to issue them because he will not do so given his character in the actual world.

This response by Adams (at least going by the IEP account) ignores the divine omnipotence: God cannot do everything, but he can do everything that is logically possible.  But then the logically possible and the really possible coincide: they are extensionally equivalent. For anything God can do is really possible. So if God can do anything logically possible, then the logically possible and the really possible are coextensive.  (Of course they remain intensionally distinct, distinct on the semantic plane.)

Note that if God has a wholly good character in the actual world, then he has a wholly good character in every possible world: for he exists in every possible world and his omnibenevolence is one of his essential attributes. It therefore avails nothing to say that commanding cruelty is not something that God will do, given his character in the actual world. For he has the same character in every possible world, and in every such world what is really possible for God coincides with what is logically possible.

It seems to me that the 'bite the bullet' response bites the dust.