I composed this entry with Lukáš Novák in mind. I hope to secure his comments.
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Marco Santambrogio, "Meinongian Theories of Generality," Nous, December 1990, p. 662:
. . . I take existence to mean just this: an entity, i, exists iff there is a determinate answer to every question concerning it or in other words, for every F(x) either F[x/i] or ~F[x/i] holds. The Tertium Non Datur is the hallmark of existence or reality. This is entirely in the Meinong-Twardowski tradition.
In other words, existence is complete determinateness or completeness: Necessarily, for any x, x exists if and only if x is complete, i.e., satisfies the property version of the Law of Excluded Middle (tertium non datur). Now I have long maintained that whatever exists is complete, but I have never been tempted by the thesis that whatever is complete exists. My intuitions on this matter are Thomistic rather than Scotistic.
According to Etienne Gilson, Duns Scotus held that actually to exist in reality = to be complete:
. . . actual existence appears only when an essence is, so to speak, bedecked with the complete series of its determinations. (Being and Some Philosophers, Pontifical Institute, Toronto, 1952, 2nd ed. , 89)
Actual existence thus appears as inseparable from the essence when essence is taken in its complete determination. (88)
An actually existing essence is, meaning by "is" that it exists, as soon as it is fully constituted by its genus, its species, its own individual "thisness," as well as all the accidents which go to make up its being. (86)
It follows that an actually existing thing is not the result of the superaddition of existence to a complete essence, but is just an essence in its completeness. This implies that there is no distinctio realis. For if an actually existing individual essence exists in virtue of being completely determinate, then there cannot be any distinction in reality between that complete essence and its existence. If Socrates is a wholly determinate essence, then, on the Scotist view as glossed by Gilson, there is no need for anything more to make him exist: nothing needs to be added ab extra.
What we have here are two very different theories of existence. For the Scotist, existence belong in the order of essence as the maximal determinateness of essence. For the Thomist, existence does not belong in the order of essence but is situated 'perpendicular' to it. Is there any way rationally to decide between these views? Could there be complete nonexistent objects? If yes, then the Scotist view would stand refuted. If no, then the Thomist view would stand refuted.
Well, why can't there be complete nonexistent objects? Imagine the God of Leibniz, before the creation, contemplating an infinity of possible worlds, each of them determinate down to the last detail. None of them exists or is actual. But each of them is complete. One of them God calls 'Charley.' God says, Fiat Charley! And Charley exists. It is exactly the same world which 'before' was merely possible, but 'now' is actual. The difference is not one of essence, but one of existence.
So, while existence entails completeness, why should completeness entail existence?
(Other questions arise at this point which are off-topic, for example, why Charley over Barley? Why Charley over any other world? Must God have a reason? And what would it be? Would it be because Charley is the best of all possible worlds? Is there such a things as the BEST of all possible worlds? Why some world rather than no world? And so on. But these questions are off-topic. Focus like a laser on the question about the 'nature' of existence.)
The theological imagery is supposed to help you understand the ontological point. But we needn't bring God into it. It would also not be to the point to protest that God creates out of nothing, not out of mere possibles. My concern here is with the nature of existence, not with the nature of God or of divine creation. All I need for my argument is the possibility that there be maximally determinate individual essences that do not exist. If there are, then existence is not completeness. But one man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens. Can either side refute the other?
In the end the dispute may come down to a profound and irresolvable difference in intuitions.
What say you, Dr. Novak?
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