Here is another argument that may be banging around in the back of the heads of those who are hostile to the doctrine that there are modes of being, the MOB doctrine to give it a name:
1. If there are modes of existence, then 'exist(s)' is not univocal.
2. If 'exist(s)' is not univocal, then it is equivocal.
3. If 'exists(s)' is equivocal, then existents are partitioned into separate and unrelatable domains.
4. It is not the case that existents are partitioned into separate and unrelatable domains.
Ergo
5. There are no modes of existence.
I believe that this argument can be fairly imputed to Quentin Gibson. (See The Existence Principle, Kluwer 1998, p. 26 et passim) Of course, the above is my reconstruction; he is nowhere near as clear as I am being.
The argument is seductive but unsound. (2) is false: if a term is not univocal it does not follow that it is equivocal in the sense of 'equivocal' needed to make (3) true. I believe I have already demonstrated this. 'Exists(s)' is not univocal as between
6. Jewish philosophers exist
and
7. Kripke exists.
But it doesn't follow from this lack of univocity that we have sheer equivocity of the river bank /financial bank sort. (6) makes an instantiation claim while (7) doesn't. 'Exist' in (6) is a second-level predicate while in (7) 'exists' is a first-level predicate. So the predicate is used to say different things of different things. In (6) being-instantiated, but not singular existence, is being predicated of the concept Jewish philosopher. In (7) singular existence, but not being-instantiated, is being predicated of Kripke.
And yet there is a systematic connection between the two sentences and the two senses of 'exist(s).' If a first-level concept 'exists,' i.e., is instantiated, then it is instantiated by an individual that exists. And if an individual exists, then there is some concept it instantiates.
Call this equivocity if you like, but it is not the sort of equivocity that has the unacceptable consequence that is recorded in the consequent of (3). It doesn't lead to a partitioning of existents into separate and unrelatable domains.
Or take the substance/accident case. Substances exist and accidents exist. If so, they exist in different ways. Or so say I. Accidents exist-in substances while substances do not. Does 'exist(s)' have two different senses as applied to substances and accidents? Yes, but they are connected senses. So it doesn't follow from this lack of univocity that substances and accidents belong in separate and unrelatable domains. Quite the contrary! It is precisely because they exist in different ways that we can render intelligible how they are related.
We are drifting in the direction of the old analogia entis. I can feel it.