Maverick Philosopher: Strictly Philosophical

The Dictionary Fallacy

What I will call the Dictionary Fallacy is the fallacy of thinking that certain philosophical questions can be answered by consulting dictionaries.  The philosophical questions I have in mind are those of the form What is X? or What is the nature of X?  High on the list:  What is justice?  Knowledge? Existence?  Goodness?  But also:  What is hypocrisy? Lying? Self-deception? Envy? Jealousy? Schadenfreude? Socialism?  Taxation?  Motherhood? For example, if a woman is pregnant, and if the pregnancy is well-advanced, in the eight month, say, is the woman the mother of the fetus growing within her, or is she a mother only when she gives birth? Can this question be resolved by consultation of a dictionary? The dictionaries I am referring to are ordinary dictionaries, not philosophical dictionaries. 

1. Suppose I want to know what tolerance in the social or political sense is.  I pull a dictionary from the shelf and read, "a sympathy or indulgence for beliefs or practices differing from or conflicting with one's own." (Webster's New Collegiate, 1977, pp. 1227-1228)  This is not a bad definition but it seems to go wrong in one respect.  Arguably, toleration entails dislike of or dissent from that which is tolerated.  If I tolerate your socialist views, then I dissent from them.  Otherwise I wouldn't be tolerating them.  This entailment seems built into the very concept of toleration.  That with which I sympathize or agree I do not tolerate, strictly speaking.  Now it is easy to imagine people disagreeing with the notion that tolerance entails dislike or disapproval or dissent.  "Why can't I be said to tolerate what I approve of?  I approve of my wife's frugality, and therefore I tolerate it."

At this point one must ask what the debate is about.  Is it about the way 'tolerance' and cognates are actually used by  English speakers?  Then it may well be that the lexical definition cited is correct. This is an empirical question for lexicographers.  But if the question is about the nature of tolerance, then the appeal to actual usage is not conclusive, though it is undeniably a good starting point. For actual use may be misuse.  Everyone knows that change is not the same as improvement. Every improvement is a change, but not every change is an improvement.  Some changes are for the worse.  But  suppose the Obama Crowd brings it about that the word 'change' comes to be used interchangeably with the word 'improvement.'  The dictionary meaning of 'change' would then give us a very poor understanding of the nature of change.  The nature of change does not depend on how people use or misuse the word 'change.'  It is therefore a fallacy to think that one can answer the philosophical question as to the nature of X by recourse to the dictionary definition of the word 'X.'

2.  The dictionary I just cited gives 'envious' as a synonym of 'jealous.' (p. 620)  Now they are as a matter of fact often used synonymously in English. But surely the nature of envy is different from the nature of jealousy.  To feel envy is to feel diminished in one’s sense of self-worth by another’s success or well-being. Thus if A feels bad because B won an award, then A envies B his winning of the award. It is a misuse of language to say that A is jealous of B in a situation like this. Jealousy requires three people, whereas envy requires only two. Suppose A and B are married, and C shows an amatory interest in B. A may well come to feel jealous of C. To use ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ interchangeably is to ride roughshod over a simple distinction, and that is something that clear-headed people will want to avoid.  Someone who claims that there is no difference between envy and jealousy on the strength of the fact that one or more reputable dictionaries give 'envious' as a synonym of 'jealous' has committed what I am calling the Dictionary Fallacy.  They are falsely assuming that the way a word 'X' is used is a sure guide to the nature of X.

3. I am of course assuming that there are certain distinctions 'out there in the world' and that responsible language-users must use words in such a way as to do justice to them.  For example, there is a difference between inference and implication even if everyone comes to use 'infer' and 'imply' interchangeably.  And there is a difference between raising a question and begging a question even if the corresponding phrases come to be used interchangeably.

4.  I am also assuming that the philosophical enterprise is constructive and theoretical: the aim is to construct theories that illuminate our experience.  To understand the moral life, for example, one must understand such phenomena as hypocrisy, idealism, cynicism, jealousy, envy, resentment, irony, Schadenfreude, lying, dissembling, self-deception, bad faith, and others besides.  Presumably, the analyses of these individual phenomena must fit together to from a coherent whole.  An adequate theory cannot consist of a disconnected assortment of piecemeal analyses.  This implies that the definitions of key terms such as 'hypocrite' cannot be purely lexical.  As already pointed out, it is not the word but the thing we wish to understand, and the word as actually used is no sure guide, and in some cases no sort of guide, to the nature of the thing.  As theorists of the moral life we must therefore craft precisifying definitions.  These involve a substantial stipulative component, though they cannot of course be merely stipulative.  One cannot, for example, stipulate that a hypocrite is a person who perceives a gap within himself between what he is and what he ought to be.  That deviates too far from the lexical meaning of the term.  But one may have to adjust the meaning of 'hypocrite' away from its lexical definition somewhat to make it cohere properly with other terms in the vicinity, terms that figure in our theory of moral phenomena.

What I will call the Dictionary Fallacy is the fallacy of thinking that certain philosophical questions can be answered by consulting dictionaries.  The philosophical questions I have in mind are those of the form What is X? or What is the nature of X?  High on the list:  What is justice?  Knowledge? Existence?  Goodness?  But also:  What is hypocrisy? Lying? Self-deception? Envy? Jealousy? Schadenfreude? Socialism?  Taxation?  Motherhood? For example, if a woman is pregnant, and if the pregnancy is well-advanced, in the eight month, say, is the woman the mother of the fetus growing within her, or is she a mother only when she gives birth? Can this question be resolved by consultation of a dictionary? The dictionaries I am referring to are ordinary dictionaries, not philosophical dictionaries. 

1. Suppose I want to know what tolerance in the social or political sense is.  I pull a dictionary from the shelf and read, "a sympathy or indulgence for beliefs or practices differing from or conflicting with one's own." (Webster's New Collegiate, 1977, pp. 1227-1228)  This is not a bad definition but it seems to go wrong in one respect.  Arguably, toleration entails dislike of or dissent from that which is tolerated.  If I tolerate your socialist views, then I dissent from them.  Otherwise I wouldn't be tolerating them.  This entailment seems built into the very concept of toleration.  That with which I sympathize or agree I do not tolerate, strictly speaking.  Now it is easy to imagine people disagreeing with the notion that tolerance entails dislike or disapproval or dissent.  "Why can't I be said to tolerate what I approve of?  I approve of my wife's frugality, and therefore I tolerate it."

At this point one must ask what the debate is about.  Is it about the way 'tolerance' and cognates are actually used by  English speakers?  Then it may well be that the lexical definition cited is correct. This is an empirical question for lexicographers.  But if the question is about the nature of tolerance, then the appeal to actual usage is not conclusive, though it is undeniably a good starting point. For actual use may be misuse.  Everyone knows that change is not the same as improvement. Every improvement is a change, but not every change is an improvement.  Some changes are for the worse.  But  suppose the Obama Crowd brings it about that the word 'change' comes to be used interchangeably with the word 'improvement.'  The dictionary meaning of 'change' would then give us a very poor understanding of the nature of change.  The nature of change does not depend on how people use or misuse the word 'change.'  It is therefore a fallacy to think that one can answer the philosophical question as to the nature of X by recourse to the dictionary definition of the word 'X.'

2.  The dictionary I just cited gives 'envious' as a synonym of 'jealous.' (p. 620)  Now they are as a matter of fact often used synonymously in English. But surely the nature of envy is different from the nature of jealousy.  To feel envy is to feel diminished in one’s sense of self-worth by another’s success or well-being. Thus if A feels bad because B won an award, then A envies B his winning of the award. It is a misuse of language to say that A is jealous of B in a situation like this. Jealousy requires three people, whereas envy requires only two. Suppose A and B are married, and C shows an amatory interest in B. A may well come to feel jealous of C. To use ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ interchangeably is to ride roughshod over a simple distinction, and that is something that clear-headed people will want to avoid.  Someone who claims that there is no difference between envy and jealousy on the strength of the fact that one or more reputable dictionaries give 'envious' as a synonym of 'jealous' has committed what I am calling the Dictionary Fallacy.  They are falsely assuming that the way a word 'X' is used is a sure guide to the nature of X.

3. I am of course assuming that there are certain distinctions 'out there in the world' and that responsible language-users must use words in such a way as to do justice to them.  For example, there is a difference between inference and implication even if everyone comes to use 'infer' and 'imply' interchangeably.  And there is a difference between raising a question and begging a question even if the corresponding phrases come to be used interchangeably.

4.  I am also assuming that the philosophical enterprise is constructive and theoretical: the aim is to construct theories that illuminate our experience.  To understand the moral life, for example, one must understand such phenomena as hypocrisy, idealism, cynicism, jealousy, envy, resentment, irony, Schadenfreude, lying, dissembling, self-deception, bad faith, and others besides.  Presumably, the analyses of these individual phenomena must fit together to from a coherent whole.  An adequate theory cannot consist of a disconnected assortment of piecemeal analyses.  This implies that the definitions of key terms such as 'hypocrite' cannot be purely lexical.  As already pointed out, it is not the word but the thing we wish to understand, and the word as actually used is no sure guide, and in some cases no sort of guide, to the nature of the thing.  As theorists of the moral life we must therefore craft precisifying definitions.  These involve a substantial stipulative component, though they cannot of course be merely stipulative.  One cannot, for example, stipulate that a hypocrite is a person who perceives a gap within himself between what he is and what he ought to be.  That deviates too far from the lexical meaning of the term.  But one may have to adjust the meaning of 'hypocrite' away from its lexical definition somewhat to make it cohere properly with other terms in the vicinity, terms that figure in our theory of moral phenomena.

What is Political Correctness?

(Written 7 May 2016. Corrigendum below)

One often reads the following definition of political correctness.  "Someone who is politically correct believes that language and actions that could be offensive to others, especially those relating to sex and race, should be avoided." Here.  Merriam-Webster, Wikipedia, and other sources offer similar definitions.

This is not at all what 'political correctness' means when used by people in the know.  The above definition conflates being politically correct with being polite, civil, and respectful of others and it conflates being politically incorrect with being rude, offensive, and disrespectful of others.   For example, Donald Trump was not being politically incorrect when he made his vile comments about Megan Kelly and Carly Fiorina.  He was being rude and offensive in a politically foolish display of misogyny.

It is worth noting that in some cases rude and offensive speech is justified as a response to same.  Justified or not, the politically incorrect and the rude/offensive/disrespectful are separate categories.  A Venn diagram may help where the A region below contains politically incorrect statements and behaviors, the B region contains rude/offensive/disrespectful statements and behaviors, and the intersection of the two classes contains statements and behaviors that are both.  

For example, suppose someone says, 'Broads do not belong in the Navy SEALs or the Army Rangers.'  This statement is both rude/offensive/disrespectful and politically incorrect while 'Women do not belong in Navy SEALs or the Army Rangers' is politically incorrect but not (objectively) offensive.  Of course, one might take inappropriate offense at the second statement, but that is his or her problem. People, cry bullies and liberals especially, take offense at the damndest things!

One way to define a term is extensionally by giving a list of the items to which it applies.  These are the items that fall within the extension of the term.  I will now provide  a list of some politically incorrect statements and then ask what they have in common.  This will allow us to pin down the intension of the term 'politically incorrect,' and from there the intension of 'politically correct.' Here then are some politically incorrect statements:

• Blacks are incarcerated in proportionally greater numbers than whites because they commit proportionally more crimes.
• Not only do black lives matter; all lives matter including the lives of law enforcement agents and the lives of the unborn.
• While Muslims qua Muslims ought not be barred from political office, Sharia-supporting Muslims ought to be.
• The killing of innocent human beings is a grave moral evil, and this includes the killing of pre-natal human beings.
• At the present time, the majority of terrorists in the world derive their ideological support from one religion, Islam.
• The Crusades were defensive wars.
• The purpose of taxation is to raise monies to cover the costs of governance, not to redistribute wealth.
• Free market economies under the rule of law are more likely to lead to human flourishing than socialist economies.
• There was no moral equivalence  between the USA and the USSR.
• Women are 'underrepresented' in philosophy, not because of 'sexism' or a male conspiracy to exclude them, but because of the following factors: women as a group are not as interested in philosophy as men are; the feminine nature is averse to the argumentative and occasionally 'blood sport' aspect of philosophy; women as a group are just not as good at philosophy as men, where exceptions such as Elizabeth Anscombe prove the rule.
• Apart from the STEM disciplines, the universities of the land have become leftist seminaries, hotbeds of leftist indoctrination. They have lost touch with their noble ideals and traditions.
• Equality of opportunity is no guarantee of equality of outcome, and it is fallacious to argue from inequality of outcome to sexism or racism as the cause.
• Political correctness is a major threat to the values of the West including the West's commitment to open debate, toleration, and free inquiry. 

So there you have a baker's dozen of politically incorrect statements.  There are plenty more where those came from.  I would say that each is true, though I will grant that some are rationally debatable.  But whether true or false, rationally defensible or indefensible, they are all clear examples of politically incorrect statements.

Now what do they have in common in virtue of which they are all instances of political incorrectness?  The most important  common feature is that each opposes the contemporary liberal or leftist or 'progressive' worldview.  To be politically correct, then, is to support the leftist worldview and the leftist agenda.  It follows that a conservative cannot be politically correct.  

P.C. comes from the C.P.  The P. C. mentality is a successor form of the Communist mentality.  To be politically correct is to toe the party line.  It is to support leftist positions and tactics, including the suppression of the free speech rights of opponents. Essential to leftism is the double standard.  So while  the politically correct insist on their own free speech rights, they deny them to their opponents, which is why they routinely shout them down.

Corrigendum: 

While many leftists employ double standards, the characteristically hard-Left tactic is Alinskyite in nature as explained here.