Theism and Evil, Naturalism and Intentionality

As I define ‘theism’ and ‘naturalism,’ no one can be both a theist and a naturalist. But one could be neither a theist nor a naturalist. Theism and naturalism can’t both be true, but they can both be false. Thus the two positions are logical contraries, not contradictories. McTaggart, to take but one example, was neither a theist nor a naturalist.

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So if naturalism is shown to be false, theism does not follow as an immediate consequence. Similarly, if theism is shown to be false, naturalism does not follow as an immediate consequence. Nevertheless, if one is true, then the other is false, and vice versa. This is consistent with both position’s being reasonable (rationally acceptable). Being true and being rationally acceptable are distinct properties. I maintain that both theism and naturalism are reasonable. Part of what this means is that both are consistent with the current state of scientific knowledge. Thus it is not the case that naturalists are in possession of some cosmological or neuroscientific or other knowledge of which theists are ignorant, and which would transform those theists into naturalists if only they overcame their ignorance. Simply put, the best theists (Swinburne, Plantinga, et al.) are not theists out of ignorance, and the best naturalists are not naturalists due to some special scientific knowledge they possess.



Naturalism for present purposes is equivalent to the view that mind cannot occur unless tied to a physical substratum. Thus naturalism rules out divine mind, classically conceived, as well as the pre- and post-existence of disembodied finite minds. This needs explication, and canvassing various definitions of ‘naturalism’ would be a good idea, but this is the blogosphere and I need to get right to the point, which is:



No self-respecting naturalist takes intentionality (and other recalcitrant phenomena) to refute naturalism. The atitude is: there must be a good response to objections from intentionality,qualia, reason, truth, etc. even if we naturalists have yet to arrive at satisfying versions of these responses. Thus naturalists do not take the various objections as threats to their position but as invitations to articulate and refine it.



Now if it is reasonable for naturalists to proceed in this way, would it not also be reasonable for theists to proceed similarly in the face of such objections as the one from evil? Could not a theist hold that there must be a good answer to the problem of evil even if no theist is in a position to give that answer?



What I am arguing then is a parity thesis: theism and naturalism are on a par in respect of their reasonableness. In particular, the fact (if it is a fact) that there is no truly satisfying theistic answer to the problem of evil does not show that theism is unreasonable unless the fact (if it is a fact) that there is no truly satisfying answer to the problem of intentionality shows that naturalism is unreasonable.



I simply assume for the space of this post that the ‘facts’ mentioned are indeed facts. That is, I assume that the naturalist has no satisfactory answer to the objection from intentionality, and that the theist has no satisfactory answer to the objection from evil. Of course, there are plenty of answers on either side, but it goes without saying that an answer is not the same as a satisfactory answer. For example, one answer to the problem of evil is to say that evil is an illusion. This answer, however, is spectacularly unsatisfactory for reasons I won’t give here.



The fundamental idea is that one can have good reason to believe something even if one cannot satisfactorily answer every objection. For example, I have good reason to believe that I possess (libertarian) freedom of the will. I argue as follows:



1. I am morally responsible for some of my actions and omissions.

2. No one is morally responsible for an action/omisson unless he possesses freedom of the will.

Therefore

3. I possess freedom of the will.



This argument is not wholly compelling, but then few if any arguments have this property. My point is merely that this and other arguments render my belief in libertarian freedom of the will reasonable. It is reasonable because I just gave a reason for it, namely, the conjunction of (1) and (2), and this reason entails (3). Moreover, (1) and (2) are reasonably accepted.



Although I have good (though not wholly compelling) reason to believe in freedom of the will, how is free will possible in a deterministic, or even an indeterministic, universe? How could a causal chain, whether deterministic or probabilistic, have an absolute beginning in a free agent? Suppose I have no satisfactory answer to these and related questions. Suppose I cannot explain how libertarian freedom of the will is possible. My argument above shows or at least supports the contention that it is actual. And what is actual is possible, whether or not I can explain how it is possible.



I conclude that one can have a good reason to believe something even if one cannot satisfactorily answer every objection. The theist and the naturalist can reasonably adhere to their respective positions even in the teeth of objections that they cannot presently answer. They could reasonably take these objections as challenges and inducements to further research.



Or would it be more reasonable for them to suspend belief?

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Comments

[Dennis Mangan]

J.L. Mackie, in his Ethics, used the analogy of a game for our system of morality. Hence your argument on freedom of the will would go like this: 1. I am morally responsible for some of my actions and omissions.(In the morality "game".) 2. No one is morally responsible for an action/omisson unless he possesses freedom of the will.(In the morality "game".) Therefore 3. I possess freedom of the will.(In the morality "game".) The idea being that morality is a human institution, not something cosmic. So I think one needs to show that morality has a wider reach than the cement for human societies before it can be used to argue for freedom of the will. Hope that makes sense.

[Bill Vallicella]

Dennis, Makes perfect sense, and thanks for bringing it up. (Agreeing that something makes sense is not the same as agreeing that it is true or even well-supported.) One problem with relativizing my argument to the morality game, is that there is an important sense in which morality is not a game: I am free to play or not to play any given game, but I am not free to renounce my status as a moral being. I cannot divest myself of my moral responsibility or my free of the will. There are times I wish I could, and simply 'go on automatic.' I am free to act this way or that, but not free to be free or determined. If I am moral by nature, as I would insist, then in what sense is morality a game? Perhaps in a sense so loose as to be useless. But yours is a good comment as it gets me thinking about something I want to think about further. It goes to show that focused comments can be very useful.