More on Nietzsche on Conviction

Paul Craddick, commenting on my interpretation of Nietzsche's "Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies," writes:



I believe that your interpretation here is mistaken.



You apparently attribute an implicit universal quantifier to N's assertion, taking the aphorism as tantamount to "Any/all convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies." Only on that reading would the truth of the statement be incompatible with asserting it "convincingly."



BV: You are right on both points.



PC: Both beholding the aphorism "dangling," as it were (outside any wider context), and considering it in light of my studies of N's works, I take the natural and correct reading to be: "[In the normal course of things; or: More often than not] convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies."



BV: Except that N does not say that. Further, when a quantifier is ommitted, the universal quantifier is more often than not implied. Examples: Men are mortal. Tigers are animals. Electrons have a negative charge.



What I object to in Nietzsche and in much (not all) Continental philosophy is the loose and literary and exaggerated rhetoric that is often employed. You apparently agree with me that prefixing a universal quantifier to the Nietzschean dictum renders it self-vitiating. Well then, that is a point worth making, is it not?



But what happens if we use some particular quantifier such as 'Some' or 'Many' or 'Most'? Then we get, if not triviality, then something very close to it. That convictions often interfere with the pursuit of truth is an insight as old as philosophy. Indeed, it is one of the founding, or constituitve, insights of philosophy. We don't need Nietzsche to learn that. Who was Socrates if not one who questioned the taken-for-granted? Consider also the long history of scepticism, the critical inquiries of Descartes, Kant, etc.



My point can be expressed in terms of a dilemma. Either supply a universal quantifier or don't. If the former, then self-refutation. If the latter, then near triviality.



Still, I don't deny that it is an good aphorism as aphorisms go; but is smacks of that perverse Nietzschean illogic that surfaces in many passages. The aphorism's power and punch derives from the (suppressed) universal quantifier; replace it with a particular quantifier and the result is rather more anemic.



PC: I couldn't reach the online archive of the Opera to try to nail down what word is being translated as "convictions." I'd be interested to see if it is at least cognate with what Kaufmann translates as "prejudice" in BG/E, for I think that therein lies the rub - like many of his better aphorisms, this one encapsulates one of N's key insights.



BV: I'll bet the word is Ueberzeugungen. Well, I just looked it up, and I see I was right: Here is the entire aphorism #483:



Feinde der Wahrheit. -- Ueberzeugungren sind gefaehrlichere Feinde der Wahrheit als Luegen.



I'd wager that what Kaufmann translates as 'prejudice' is Vorurteil.



PC: In speaking, for example, of the "prejudices" of the philosophers, N means something like "cherished beliefs." Hence there's a "moral" component to professing and articulating a philosophy: the philosopher is all-too-often (because he is all-too-human) attached to his views (they are suffused by, and/or form a system with, his "pro and con"). Here, then, is one of the leitmotifs of his philosophy, and certainly gets at one of the many senses of that protean locution, "Beyond Good and Evil"; to wit, N proposes that it's a desideratum for the philosopher to attain a "height" from which he can look down on, and assess, himself and his allegiances (cp. the aphorism from N's notebooks, in which he maintains that it is not having the courage of one's convictions which is needful, but rather the courage for an attack on them).



BV: Yes, you know your Nietzsche.



PC: The coming "free spirits" (philosophers of the future) will be characterized by "attempts" or "experiments," as opposed to the "rigor" of most past thinkers (cp. Kant) which, for N, equates to rigor mortis . The same insight (re: the contagion of dogma or ossified belief) argues for the ideal of a "Gaya Scienza," and ties in to the wicked fun N has in calling himself an "immoralist": the authentic philosopher is the bad conscience of his day and age, which -stating the same thing another way - puts him at-odds with the regnant mores. But the "good and the just" - the self-satisfied and/or self-righteous everymen who exemplify a cultural milieu - stand in the way of an authentic movement of thought; thus the "god" which the free-spirited philosopher would introduce necessarily appears as a devil to a preponderance of his contemporaries. And N claims that most past philosophers have been in effect cheerleaders for the views - sc., convictions - of the people; they are articulate bearers and rationalizers of the cherished beliefs of the age. Hence the low value of - the need to be ever-vigilant with respect to - their "philosophical" convictions ...



I do agree with you that N can be perverse and muddled, but I don't see it here - rather, this aphorism strikes me as asserting something profoundly powerful, however much the details ought to be qualified.



I'm sure we'll have occasion to clash again when you write on "perspectivism," because I'm not convinced that the weight of N's work supports the radically perspectival interpretation; or, at least, I'm not sure if one can make an ultimately satisfying case for him definitively holding to either perspectivism or some perspective-centric realism.



BV: So much the better if N is not a perspectivist. Are we agreed that perspectivism is incoherent? Thanks for writing.

Comments

[Paul Craddick]

Bill, I'm glad to have you as an interlocutor. To the extent that we differ, you're a formidable opponent, but the atmosphere of civility and clarity which you help to create means that both of us "win," no matter who prevails on this or that point. I'll quote a few of your statements or questions in reponse to me, and then offer my thoughts. "... when a quantifier is ommitted, the universal quantifier is more often than not implied" I'm not sure how this would be established - perhaps via a long enumeration of instances, which might conclude to a Millian "universal." And here one needs to be careful not to cherry-pick one's examples. I can certainly think of some non-canned ones which are contrary to your proposed rule: "Apples are good this time of year" "English people are class-conscious" "People are strange" (nearer kin, in a way, to N's aphorism) "Generalizations are dangerous" (Also, cp. the "laws" of economics [putting aside the a-priori's of the Austrian school]: they're tendencies, or "for-the-most-parts"). Anyhow, even if we stipulate as to the general rule, one needs to be vigilant for the exceptions, and be sensitive to context (more on this below). " ... You apparently agree with me that prefixing a universal quantifier to the Nietzschean dictum renders it self-vitiating. Well then, that is a point worth making, is it not? " Sure - but the point that you made didn't have a conditional character; to wit, if this is what Nietzsche means, then the utterance is incoherent. Rather, you assumed without further ado that Nietzsche was talking nonsense. As I understand it, the principle of charitable interpretation requires that a thinker's propositions be construed in the light most favorable to his argument as a whole (i.e., taken at their strongest), if such can be done without sacrifice of coherence (both the plain sense of words, as well as in the harmonization of the proposition(s) with the containing system of notions). To say "as a whole" implies a wider context; in this case, that arguably means N's overall philosophy. I endeavored to show how the aphorism fits into (or expresses) that overall philosophy in a way which merits serious attention. "... That convictions often interfere with the pursuit of truth is an insight as old as philosophy. Indeed, it is one of the founding, or constituitve, insights of philosophy. We don't need Nietzsche to learn that." Well, I connected the aphorism to several major aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy - how, in a way, those aspects are present, in ovo, in the aphorism. You seemed to concede the point - are you really prepared to say, then, that some of the major tenets of, e.g., BG/E are "as old as philosophy"? I, for one, think not. Furthermore, it doesn't follow that if a philosopher articulates and addresses a founding insight of philosophy, such intellectual labor is somehow for naught - or, at best, redundant. For example, the distinction between appearance and reality is as old as philosophy. Yet that foundational insight is "unwoven" is fascinatingly disparate, and mutually exclusive, ways, by thinkers as diverse as Plato's Socrates, Kant, Hume, Hegel, et al.. Similarly, with Nietzsche an old insight is the starting point - not, as you apparently suggest, the ending point. One of many things that strikes me as novel in Nietzsche's treatment of "convictions" is how, in effect, he says that most "philosophers" de jure have been sophists de facto, especially with respect to moral philosophy. In underscoring the extent to which philosophers heretofore have operated under the implicit proviso that "truth must be edifying" N claims that they merely baptized the moral "prejudices" - cherished beliefs - of their day and age. Now, I wouldn't want to say this unqualifiedly about every renowned thinker by any stretch, but it seems to me that there is an awful lot of truth in the claim, and it merits serious reflection: cp. the relation of the content of Kant's moral philosophy to his Lutheran piety, for example; or - to choose a favorite Nietzschean vituperation - how the ideals of socialism so perfectly reflected the dialectical kernel of 19th century thought. In short, one very often sees the finding of bad reasons for what is believed willy-nilly. In what now strikes me as a bit of an ironic twist, previously on your blog you were kind enough to mention approvingly my quasi-Aristotelian formulation of a putative virtue, the articulation of which, in part, was inspired by N's considerations. While I don't like quoting myself, I can hardly describe the virtue more succinctly than I do in my bio-sketch: "...'provisional certainty' is what we ought to strive for – a mean between the defective state, wishy-washyness, and the excessive one, fanaticism." While my language invokes the Aristotelian mean, and, as you say, the core of the insight is as old as philosophy, I believe it's most telling that Aristotle - so far as I know - never proposed an arete which entails or requires something like "provisionality of certainty." But N certainly did. It was beautifully expressed in that posthumously published aphorism which I cited in my first rejoinder: what is needful is the courage for an attack on one's convictions. "Are we agreed that perspectivism is incoherent?" If by "perspectivism" we mean the claim which may be summarized as "There is no 'knowledge', but only perspectives," then yes indeed - for one immediately wants to know whether that statement is merely a perspective (in which case it loses all significance), or is a claim to knowledge (in which case the uttering cancels out the utterance). On my reading, it's an open question how far Nietzsche pushes his logical luck, in this connection. Although now isn't the time to take up the issue in detail, in conclusion I'll advert to the other "side" of the aphorism which occasioned this discussion, and which hasn't yet been mentioned: the contrast of convictions with "lies" . As you know, N makes quite a lot out of the supposed fruitfulness of various falsehoods. It would be an interesting exercise to limn how that redounds to points already made - for example, how it complements to some extent the view that "truth isn't necessarily edifying." Thanks for the discussion.

[Bill Vallicella]

Paul, Here is a real life example that supports your point of view: "Hold the quiche: Poll finds women now want manly men." So I concede that it is a difficult empirical question which quantifier is being presupposed. I agree that the principle of charity is important. But given the radical character of N's thinking, it might in the end be more charitable to read him as saying something shocking rather than something trivial. N takes the critical attitude that is constitutive of philosophy and radicalizes it unto an extreme scepticism that is incoherent in the end. It is that that I object to. There is another problem. Does N presuppose the value of truth in his 'convictions' aphorism? If yes, how does that square with all the passages in which he questions the value of truth for life? Thanks for the discussion.

[Paul Craddick]

Bill, To do justice to your parting question, one would need to write an extended essay. Questioning the value of truth for life isn't - here's our theme again - to say that truth has no value for life, but rather it underscores the fact that truth may in fact be (emotionally and existentially) shattering - and certainly isn't, of necessity, edifying. But this leads to another singular point, which again I can only take a stab at - and which gets at the most plausible realist interpretation of N's "perspectivism." Man, according to N, doesn't ultimately desire "life" (sc., survival), but rather, "will to power" (efficacy, mastery, capacity). And he believes that the "will to truth" is a concomitant of will to (human) power, developed and "spiritualized." Thus a large measure, at least, of his questioning the value of truth is meant to exhibit its relation, qua desideratum, to the fundamental drive of will to power. That is to say, man desires truth on account of his predilection for self-overcoming.